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Abstract
From burqa ban to minaret ban, from right to detain suspected illegal immigrants to restricting
the help to migrants, the number of social laws specifically targeting a tiny proportion of citizens
has raised in recent years across Western democracies. These symbolic policies, we show, are far
from being innocuous: they can have far reaching consequences for large parts of the population.
By raising the salience of certain social traits (e.g., Muslim identity) these laws can create a labour
market loaded in favor of the majority (e.g., the non-Muslims), yielding higher unemployment rates
and spells for minority citizens. These deleterious effects arise even absent any form of bias against,
or uncertainty about, minority workers. Instead they are fully driven by social expectations about
behavior and are best understood as a form of social discrimination. Importantly, we establish
conditions under which a plurality of the citizenry demands the implementation of symbolic policies
anticipating their labor market consequences. We further highlight that the implementation of
symbolic policies is always associated with less redistribution and can be coupled with lower tax
rates. We discuss several policy recommendations to limit the possibility of social discrimination
arising.
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“Do you know how many lawyers, doctors, and engineers have come out of these blocks?
I see so many people studying, trying to become part of this country, but suddenly we are
not good enough because we don’t eat pork.”
Mina, 30, about Agervang a Muslim dominated housing estate from news article “Den-
mark swings right on immigration — and Muslims feel besieged” (Guardian, 10 June 2018)
“Ever since this government has come in, I feel like people look at me and see a Muslim
for the first time.”
An Indian butcher referring to the beef ban from news article“Why a crackdown on In-
dian cattle trade is seen as anti-muslim” (Independent, 31st July 2018).
“If [the ban on full-face coverings] was intended as a contribution in the fight against
conservative Islam, then I can only say: it’s gone belly up.”
Hermann Greylinger of the Austrian police union from news article “Austrian full-face
veil ban condemned as a failure by police” (Guardian, 27th March 2018)
1 Introduction
That majorities can use the political process to discriminate against minorities is well understood, at
least since Mill (1859) who coined the phrase “the tyranny of the majority.” Discrimination may take
the form of targeting goods and benefits in ways that marginalise minority groups, or through direct
expropriation of their assets. In this paper we investigate a more subtle form of discrimination that
can arise when political leaders choose to make minority identity a salient aspect of political choice. As
examples, consider the introduction of policies (equivalently, the use of rhetoric) that highlights minority
practice. This might take the form of forcing minority groups to identify as such via the adoption of
specific clothing (equivalently prohibiting them from doing so), placing restrictions on their practices,
or forcing them to adapt to behaviour favoured by the majority.
There is a long history of such policy. The Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 proclaimed that Jews and
Muslims must wear clothing that distinguished them from Christians. According to Appiah (2018), the
Cagots of the French and Spanish Pyrenees had no physical features, names or language distinguishing
them from their neighbours, but were forced to identify themselves “with badges pinned to their clothing,
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often duck or goose feet, or fabric fascimiles.” More recently, in 2016, 30 municipalities in France
introduced a ban on the use of the Burkini, a full body length swimsuit worn by muslim women at
the seaside. In Austria, Netherlands, Denmark and elsewhere bans have been put in place on Kosher
and Halal produce. In 2014 a beef ban was introduced in several Indian states that, while not affecting
the Hindu population who do not consume it, prohibited Muslims and Christians from consuming a
relatively cheap form of protein.
An immediate consequence of symbolic policy, such as the proclamation of the Latern Council, or
those with respect to the Cagots, is to make salient who is a member of the majority and who is
not. Similarly, as Terrence G. Peterson (quoted in the New York Times, 18 August 2016) puts it, the
burkini ban is “a way to police what is French and what is not French”. More generally, these symbolic
policies, even when enforcing majority patterns of behaviour (as in the beef ban in Indian states) make
identity a focus of political discourse and economic interaction, heightening awareness of identity and the
perception of others’ identity. For example, French politics was about little other than the burkini in the
summer of 2016, a period that (according to the Collective against Islamophobia in France which filed
a complaint with the Counseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court) “ witnessed a hysterical
political islamophobia that pits citizens against one another.” The introduction of symbolic policies
then can have a direct impact (as noted in our opening quotes) and it is this: a worker is no longer
identified by their trade be it butcher, doctor or engineer; instead they are identified as a member of a
specific group and judged as a member of that group irrespective of their human capital.
Building on this insight, we study the labour market consequences of these policies and in doing
so show their effect to be far from innocuous. In fact, they can have a significant negative impact on
minority welfare. Symbolic policies raising the salience of identity generates a labor market loaded in
favor of majority workers and to the detriment of minority workers and employers. While majority
workers find employment more easily, their minority counterparts experience higher unemployment and
longer unemployment spells and minority owned firms see their profits decrease substantially.
This finding contrasts with official justifications for the introduction of symbolic policies that stem
from first principles. For example, France’s minister for women’s rights, Laurence Rossignol, argued that
“[The burkini] is the symbol of a political project that is hostile to diversity and women’s emancipation.”
Whereas the French Prime Minister described the burkini as “a symbol of enslavement of women.”1
Similarly, the recent headscarf ban in Austrian school has been justified on the grounds that “the
1The burkini ban: what it really means when we criminalise clothes, Guardian, 24 August 2016
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measure was necessary to free girls from subjugation.”2 According to this view, enforcement of the
burkini or niqab bans was necessary in order to emancipate muslim women. They were to “be forced
to be free” according to Rousseau’s famous dictum.3 Such normative claims are contentious. From a
liberal perspective it is hard to understand why representatives of the state should take a view on what
women wear to the beach, or what Muslims have for lunch. Moreover, the target audience of these
contentious symbolic policies are often very small: it is estimated the the headscarf ban affected just
150 women in Austria and between 150 and 200 women in Denmark.4
Our assumption, instead, is that the the impact of these policies makes minority markers salient.
Building on that assumption we show that their introduction can serve the electoral interests of political
leaders.–and we explore the conditions under which this is so. At first glance, this might not appear as
a novel finding. The large literature on conflict documents many such cases. Indeed, in discussing the
causes of ethnic conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2000) remark that “political elites use violence to construct
antagonistic ethnic identities, which in turn favour more violence” with the masses following. Our
contribution is in showing that similar strategies are deployed in democracies where redistribution takes
place via political competition rather than through conflict. Furthermore, a critical difference emerges in
the role played by leaders in these contexts. In contrast to the top-down strategies typically deployed by
warlords, who use identity to mobilise and galvanise fighters for their cause, we show that democratically
elected leaders respond to the demands of majority workers when making identity salient to political
choice. The demand is, in turn, due to the advantages that such workers face when the labour force is
segregated.
Our insights into the cause and consequences of symbolic policies stem from a political economy
model that connects political choice via (two) party competition and a labor market. Specifically we
study a dynamic model where politicians compete by choosing whether to introduce a “symbolic” policy
or not alongside a proportional tax rate that is uniformly distributed. Once that policy environment
is set, workers who vary by their type (given by their membership of a majority or minority group
and their productivity) and firms are (randomly) matched. Productivity of a worker-firm relationship
2Austria approves headscarf ban in primary schools, Guardian, 16 May 2018
3In his Du Contrat Social: Ou Principes du Droit Politique published in 1762, Jean Jaques Rousseau states
that“Whoever refuses to obey the general will will be forced to do so by the entire body, this means merely that he
will be forced to be free.”
4For Austria, see “Austrian full-face veil ban condemned as a failure by police, ” The Guardian, March 27th 2018. The
same article notes that the legislation was criticised by police after it mainly resulted in the issuing of warnings against
people wearing smog masks, skiing gear and animal costumes. For Denmark, see “Protests in Denmark as ‘burqa ban’
comes into effect,” The Guardian, August 1st 2018.
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is match-specific and is unaffected by identity markers. Both majority and minority workers are ex-
ante the same, leaving no room for any form of statistical discrimination. Employment relations are
voluntary: both firm and worker must agree to a match before productivity takes place. We make two
crucial assumptions regarding identity. First, a worker or employer’s physical (minority or majority)
traits are salient, and market relations can be conditioned on identity, only in an environment where the
elected leader implements the symbolic policy. Second, we build on earlier work by Peski and Szentes
(2013) in assuming that identity traits are not just physically fixed, but also socially malleable; they
can be transferred across groups so that a majority(minority) employer who hires a minority(majority)
employee might take on their social identity and vice-versa.
Our first results connect symbolic policies and labor market discrimination. Whereas historical
episodes of overt work discrimination against minorities are common, such discrimination can also emerge
endogenously via choices made by employers and workers in a climate influenced by the policy choices
and rhetoric of politicians that makes identity focal. Labor market discrimination arises when majority
(minority) employers will only hire majority (minority) workers and majority (minority) workers only
accept employment from majority (minority) employers. We explore when such discriminatory strategies
are best responses. This depends upon the relative proportion of majority workers and employers. There
exists a “zone of discrimination” where the relative proportion of majority workers to employers is neither
too large or too small. Within this zone, a segregated labor market where majority (minority) workers
are hired by majority (minority) owned firms can emerge. The existence of this zone provides bad news
for minorities. Within it, the level of minority unemployment and the duration of their unemployment
spells are higher than those of their counterparts in the majority and than would be the case in a more
benign environment. Furthermore, we show that workplace discrimination delivers a productivity gap
between firms owned by majority employers and those owned by minority ones.
Notably, these effects – a segregated labour market with relatively poor employment prospects for
minority workers and a productivity gap between majority owned and minority owned firms – arises
solely from the adoption of identity-based employment strategies. So these phenomena may be entirely
unconnected to differences in human capital in subgroups of the population. Moreover, they need not
stem from taste-based discrimination that would arise should majority members intrinsically dislike
interacting with their minority counterparts or from statistical discrimination that would arise should a
decision-maker uses observable characteristics (such as physical traits that allow her to categorize agents)
as a proxy for otherwise unobserved human capital that is relevant to economic outcomes. Instead, the
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discrimination we uncover is fully driven by social expectations: the anticipated consequences of hiring
minority workers, working for a minority owned firms for majority employers and workers, respectively.
As such, the phenomena we describe are best understood as a form of social discrimination.
We further show labour market discrimination can benefit majority workers thereby introducing
demand for such policy. This demand (we again stress) is not driven by intrinsic taste for discrimination
(majority workers do not care what minorities eat or how they dress). It arises due to the anticipated
labour market effects. Our focus on the demand for social discrimination reveals that it need not arise
due to coordination failure or commitment problems—it might be desired by workers.
We use our political economy model to determine when symbolic policies are implemented and their
impact on redistribution. A necessary condition for symbolic policies to pass democratically is that the
proportion of majority workers is neither too small or too large. When it is too small, the majority
workforce lacks the political clout to force politicians to deliver. When it is too large then labor market
discrimination offers insufficient benefits. Indeed, in a segregated labor market, majority workers are
unable to take up employment in minority firms. The gain from discrimination (better employment
prospects with majority employers) dominates the loss (no work relationship with minority employers)
only if the proportion of minority owned firms is not too large. In particular, we show that the demand
for symbolic policies and its associated social discrimination is positive only if the minority is poorly
integrated: there are relatively more minority workers than minority firms. A surprising implication is
that (when there is no explicit prejudice against minorities) policies designed to increase the size of the
minority (perhaps through immigration) can make social discrimination less likely.
Symbolic policies do not only affect labor market outcomes, they also impact redistribution through
two distinct channels. First, labor market discrimination changes the fiscal landscape. The revenue from
taxes on production are lower when feasible and productive working relations involving social interaction
between majority and minority are prohibited. Second,because majority workers face higher employment
probability with discrimination than without, the cost of taxation increases, reducing their demand for
redistribution. Combining these two effects, redistribution is always lower with discrimination and,
sometimes, the tax rate can also decrease. As a result, minority workers suffer doubly from symbolic
policies, their employment prospects diminish because of social discrimination and the redistributive
transfers are reduced when they need it most.
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Our equilibrium analysis delivers several central messages that highlight how political and economic
institutions interact in ways that harm minorities. We conclude our analysis by focussing on policy
measures that might alleviate these negative welfare effects.
2 Literature review
Our paper relates to the economics literature on identity and its effect on discrimination and redistri-
bution. Here we highlight some of these papers and our contribution to this literature.
We relate to a classic literature on discrimination in the labour market that goes back to Becker
(2010) who focussed on taste based discrimination.5. That identity can be a source of discrimination in
equilibrium even though employers have no taste for it is shown by Arrow et al. (1973) and Phelps (1972)
who developed the notion of statistical discrimination. In these models employment discrimination
occurs when employers believe that physical attributes are correlated with human capital investments.
Our paper suggests another source of labor discrimination. Even though all agents are known to be
identical (no room for statistical discrimination), even though no individual harbours a distaste for
minorities (no room for taste-based discrimination), discrimination can arise due to discriminatory
norms in the labour market.
Several contributions have studied how payoff-irrelevant identity traits can serve as a focal point
in labor market interactions. Starting with Akerlof’s (1976) analysis of castes, several papers have
shown how the fear of punishment by one’s own group can create segregation in the labour market. In
Bramoulle´ and Goyal (2016), fear of being ostracized by in-group members sustains favouritism whereby
a firm always hires workers with the same identity trait as its owner even if more productive matches
are available. Choy (2017) shows how identity can endogenously generate a social hierarchy, whereby
some groups have superior outcomes and cooperate more than other groups. In his work, segregation is
sustained because members of upper groups are judged less trustworthy than their peers when interacting
with members from groups of lower standing. Discrimination can also be sustained as a form of self-
fulfilling prophecy. In Harbaugh and To (2014), discrimination arises because minority consumers expect
to be cheated by majority-owned firms and, therefore, refuses to invest in exploring possible beneficial
relationship. This insight is close in spirit to Eeckhout (2006) who shows that expectations of low level
5Recent contributions have shown how even if the vast majority of majority members are unbiased, the simple fear of
meeting a biased members can lead to a complete breakdown of relationships between minority and majority (e.g., Basu,
2005; Ramachandran and Rauh, 2013)
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of collaboration in mixed marriages can sustain higher level of cooperation in same-race relationships.
Unlike Eeckhout (2006), however, the equilibrium characterized in Harbaugh and To (2014) is always
pareto-dominated. Cavounidis and Lang (2015) describes a labor market equilibrium in which firms
monitor more closely black workers, which decreases the average productivity of unemployed minority
members (as less productive workers are screened and fired), and sustain the monitoring of employers
in the first place. Finally, Kamphorst and Swank (2016) shows how discrimination can sustain higher
average effort by employees.
We choose another avenue to sustain discrimination as an equilibrium outcome. We build upon work
by Peski and Szentes (2013). They developed the notion that the perceived identity of a player changes
as a result of his/her social interactions. In that paper, agents who are matched must decide whether or
not to enter into a profitable relationship with each other. Each agent has a fixed physical identity and
a malleable social one. Social color conveys information about who the agent has partnered with in her
employment history. As in our paper, Peski and Szentes show that discrimination can arise spontaneously
in equilibrium: Agents with the majority trait fear the consequences of social contamination that would
leave them enjoying less opportunities should they interact with minority members. There are several
technical differences between our approach and theirs. In Peski and Szentes (2013), an individual is
randomly allocated to the role of employer or employee upon matching. Instead, we consider a more
canonical labor market approach where the population is divided between firm owners and workers.
This allows us to determine the full set of economic consequences of social discrimination which cannot
be foreseen from Peski and Szentes’s paper (Peski and Szentes focus on the properties of equilibrium
with discrimination rather than their consequences). In addition, we embed our modified Peski and
Szentes’s framework in an institutional environment that encompasses a labour and a political market
and we explore the demand and supply of social discrimination (in Peski and Szentes, 2013, there is
no demand for discrimination as all agents lose when identity is salient). A further contribution is in
exploring the labour market and fiscal consequences of discrimination. Finally, our model also suggests
remedies to ameliorate the negative consequences on minority welfare.
In our set-up, individuals’ labour market and political decisions are a function of identity and its
salience. As such, our work connects with the large literature pioneered by Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
(see also Akerlof and Kranton, 2010). Austen-Smith and Fryer Jr (2005) explore the “acting white”
phenomena whereby human capital investments are stigmatised by peers. In their model agents face
a tradeoff in that signals that induce high wages (educational attainment) are also those that induce
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peer rejection. In Eguia (2017), investment in the majority group identity attributes from minority
members is used as a screening device. Only minority members who show high levels of investment
are assimilated and benefit from labor market opportunities available to majority members. These also
happen to be the most productive minority members who have the most to gain from assimilation. In a
related contribution, Schnakenberg (2013) highlights how individuals can use symbolic political behavior
(e.g., participation in protests) to signal the strength of their attachment to their identity. This signal
improves their interactions with members of their own group, but comes at the cost of deteriorating
relationships with out-group members. In Carvalho (2012), investment in identity attachment, in turn,
serves as a self-commitment device to avoid yielding to temptation. In contrast, in our paper, identity
is not so much an individual choice as a social and political construct. Identity becomes politically
salient when politicians choose to make it so, anticipating that workers and employers will condition
their behaviour on it.
Our paper studies the relationship between identity and redistribution and so relates to several papers
in political economy with a similar focus. Levy (2004) develops a model with endogenous party formation
showing that, when an identity dimension exists, party formation can lead to targeted redistribution to
groups with a majority identity; while Fernandez and Levy (2008) shows empirical support for the model.
Relatedly, Krasa and Polborn (2014) and Matakos and Xefteris (2017) show how a candidate’s attributes
(e.g., her/his race as in Matakos and Xefteris, 2019) and how they are viewed by the electorate can affect
the politician’s position on redistributive issues (see also Landa and Duell, 2015, for the role of identity
traits in a political agency set-up). In these contributions, identity is fixed. Instead, Shayo (2009)
analyzes agents identification with class or nation and its relationship to redistribution. In a similar
setting, Grossman and Helpman (2018) study the effect of identity on the demand for protectionist trade
policy. In turn, Penn (2008) look how institutions can shape identity choice, while Huber (2017) explores
how the social structure of a society relates to the salience of class and ethnicity. Our contribution to
this literature is twofold. We endogenize the dimensions of political competition by allowing politicians
to choose the salience of identity politics and we microfound the effect of identity on taxation and
redistribution via social discrimination in the labour market.
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3 Set-Up
We consider a set-up with two candidates A and B and a population of mass 2 which incorporate a one-
shot electoral competition stage followed by infinitely-repeated labour market stages. The population
is evenly divided between workers and employers. However, while all workers have the right to vote,
only a mass f of employers are citizens, the remaining correspond to foreign-owned firms or public
administration. The population is also characterized by its physical identity: actors exhibit either
majority trait M or minority trait m. This identity is based on identifiable features, be it religious (e.g.,
Catholics v. Muslims), racial (e.g., White Europeans v. North Africans), or even first-names (e.g., the
experiments in Adida, Laitin, and Valfort, 2016). Physical identity is not always salient socially. Its
importance depends on the policies in place in the country, which are a function of the electoral game
that we now describe.
Electoral competition
Competition takes place between two candidates A and B who are office-motivated. They receive a
payoff normalized to 1 from being in office (without loss of generality) and 0 otherwise. The candidate
obtaining the most votes wins office (ties are decided by a fair coin toss). In order to be elected, candidate
J ∈ {A,B} proposes a platform qJ . This contains two policies.
The first policy offered by candidate J is a proportional tax rate on income τJ ∈ [0, 1]. Revenues
from taxation, which we denote R(τ), are uniformly redistributed to workers (supposing that all citizens
receive transfer does not change our results). In particular, candidates cannot propose targeted transfers
to workers according to their (majority or minority) identity. We assume that there is some deadweight




, with K(·) C∞ on R,
strictly increasing and concave, and satisfying K ′(0) < 1 (for example, the function K(x) = 1−exp(−λx)
with λ < 1 satisfies all assumptions). This deadweight loss assumption means that, as is common in the
literature, we avoid full taxation.
The second policy proposed by candidate J is a symbolic policy dJ ∈ {0, 1} targeting the physical
minority. As discussed in the introduction, examples of such policies include a ban on wearing the burqa
in public places, eating beef and so on. The effect of these policies is to make the physical identity,
majority trait M or minority trait m, socially salient.
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After observing the platforms qJ , the mass 1+f of citizens casts a ballot for one of the two candidates.
We assume that, when indifferent, citizens vote against a candidate proposing the symbolic policy (if his
opponent is not) and when indifferent candidates do not propose the symbolic policy. This assumption
can be understood as due to (negligible) costs of implementing such policy. Or, alternatively, players
might suffer a (negligible) moral disutility cost from implementing policies that could be viewed as
discriminatory. This assumption also guarantees that the symbolic policy is implemented only if it
impacts the labour market and lead to discrimination. However, all our results would hold as long
as the symbolic policy increases the probability that actors condition their labor market behavior on
identity traits.6
After the election is held and platforms are implemented, citizens and non-citizen employers interact
in the labour market and so we now describe these interactions.
Labour market
The labour market takes the form of an infinitely repeated game with discrete time periods denoted
by t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. Employers own a single firm with one position to fill. In what follows we, thus, use
interchangeably the terms ‘firms’ and ‘employers’.7 If the position is filled in period t, the firm produces
and the position remains filled the following period with probability 1 − δ, δ ∈ (0, 1). If the position
is unfilled at t, then the firm is matched with a randomly drawn worker from the pool of unemployed.
Both the would-be employee and the employer must agree to enter a working relationship and, if they
do so, the firm produces in period t + 1. If either does not agree then the position remains unfilled at
t+ 1.
A match produces a quantity θ ∈ [0, 1] sold at an exogenous price of 1. We interpret θ as the worker’s
and thus firm’s productivity. Both the workers and the employers observe θ before agreeing whether to
enter a working relationship. If they do so, then in the next period, the revenue 1 × θ is split between
a fixed exogenous wage w ∈ (0, 1) for the worker and the remainder to the employer. A non-employed
worker earns 0 on the labour market as does an employer whose firm’s opening is unfilled.
6Our breaking rule for indifference guarantees that there is a direct link between the symbolic policy and discrimination
in the labor market. Using the language of empirical analysis, we focus on the average treatment effect rather than the
intention to treat effect.
7Combining this aspect of our setup with a mass 1 of employers dramatically simplifies our analysis. It guarantees that
there are as many jobs as workers. The model could be extended to firms having more than one position, but this would
complicate the identity transmission discussed below.
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We assume that productivity is match-specific. Denote θk a worker’s productivity in match k
(whether there is a working relationship). We assume that θk is drawn i.i.d. for each match according
to the Cumulative Distribution Function S(·). We impose that S(θ) = θ (i.e., productivity is drawn
from a uniform distribution) for ease of analysis.
Recall that transfers are uniformly redistributed to workers so the per-period payoff of an employer
is:
UF =
(1− τ)(θ − w) if position filled0 if position open
The per-period of a worker assumes the following form:
UW =
(1− τ)w + T (τ) if employedT (τ) if unemployed
Because we consider an infinitely-repeated labour market, we suppose that all players discount the future
with discount factor β ∈ (0, 1) so that all continuation values are well-defined.
The per-period timing in the labour market is as follows.
Filled position Open position
1. Production realized 1. No production
2. Working relationship breaks down
with probability δ.
2. Match occurs with available workers,
employer observes the match-specific θ
If so, position becomes open Matched employer and worker decide
whether to enter working relationship.
If so, position becomes filled
3. Payoffs realized, move to next period 3. Payoffs realized, move to next period
Our labor market model includes two forms of friction. First, matches are persistent. This is equiva-
lent to assuming that labour laws make lay-offs difficult (e.g., require just cause). Second, production is
delayed by one period after an employer and a worker agree to enter in a working relationship. Frictions
are important to generate our results below. However, only one form of friction is necessary for dis-
crimination to arise. Results would hold (though equilibrium conditions would obviously change) in the
current timing if matches last one period (i.e., δ → 1). Similarly, our conclusion would be substantially
unaffected if production starts immediately as long as the employment relationship can last.
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When describing the labour market subgame, note that we have made no mention of identity. Indeed,
it is important to stress that a worker’s productivity, that is known by her employer, does not depend
on identity (neither her own or that of her employer). This rules out statistical discrimination in
employment practice. Further, a worker or employer’s per-period payoff is independent of the identity
of whom they work with. Thus, in our framework, there is no room for taste-based discrimination either.
Discrimination, should it arise, can only be a phenomenon related to our notion of social identity that
we now detail.
Physical and social identity
We assume that physical identity becomes socially salient only if a social discriminatory policy is im-
plemented. More specifically, we follow Peski and Szentes (2013) and assume that each citizen is char-
acterized by a two-dimensional type (φ, s) ∈ {m,M} × {∅,m,M}.
The first coordinate (φ) corresponds to a citizen’s physical identity that is fixed. We assume that
there is a proportion αW > 1/2 of workers with physical majority trait and a proportion αF > 1/2
of employers with physical majority trait. The proportion of employers with physical majority trait is
the same among citizens and non-citizens (to avoid carrying around too many parameters) though our
results remain substantially unchanged were this not so.
The second coordinate (s) corresponds to a citizen’s social identity which can vary with social
interactions. Unlike Peski and Szentes, we assume that social identity is not always salient. Absent
the implementation of symbolic policy, all citizens look the same and their social identity type is s =
∅. If, by contrast, the symbolic policy is implemented by the winning candidate then social identity
becomes salient s ∈ {m,M}. Both the employer and the employee then observe their respective social
identity before deciding whether to enter in a working relationship. At the onset, a worker or employer’s
social identity is simply her physical identity. However, social identity can change as a result of social
interactions.
Our process of identity transmission follows Peski and Szentes (2013). Take employer l working
with worker h. Upon break down, employer l’s social identity remains unchanged with probability
1 − ρ ∈ (0, 1). With probability, ρ, employer l acquires acquires his employee’s identity sk ∈ {m,M}.
In turn, worker h’s social identity remains unchanged with probability 1 − γ ∈ (0, 1) and takes her
employer’s social identity with probability γ.
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This approach allows us to define four different categories of citizens anticipating slightly our dis-
crimination result. First, we have the pure majority with both physical and social majority traits
(φ, s) = (M,M). Second, we have the tainted majority with social minority trait: (φ, s) = (M,m).
These are the majority members referred to as ‘jew-lover,’ ‘nigger-lover,’ or ‘muslim-lovers,’ etc. de-
pending on the circumstances. Third, we can define the assimilated minority as citizens with minority
physical trait and majority social identity: (φ, s) = (m,M). Finally, we refer to the excluded minority
when both traits are minority traits: (φ, s) = (m,m).
A few remarks are in order. First, we assume that physical type M constitutes a majority of the
population for both workers and employers. However, we do not impose that the proportion is the same
among the two groups (i.e., we can have αW 6= αF ). Second, a citizen’s identity changes only if his
social identity differs from the social identity of those he interacts with. That is, we assume that social
identity is fully determined by social interactions (for tractability reasons, unlike Peski and Szentes,
2013, we do not allow for reversal whereby an agent’s social identity can return to her physical one).
We are thus considering relatively close net communities where all inhabitants have a long memory of
social interaction. Third, we assume that work relationships are a prominent form of social interactions.
Finally, for ease of exposition, we do not impose restriction on ρ and γ so full identity swaps are possible.
Equilibrium concept
The equilibrium concept is stationary Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium. We add an additional re-
quirement in supposing that the labour market adjusts immediately. That is, workers and employees
only consider their (ex-ante) expected payoff from the labour market steady state when making their
electoral decision (this allows us to drop the time subscript).
4 Labour market analysis
We first consider outcomes in the labour market when social identity is not salient and so plays no role
in hiring decisions. A worker has no incentive to decline a job offer since it only entails a wage loss.
Employers then have full power when deciding whether to fill their position. Since social identity is not
salient, all employers are identical, and differences in workers arise only due to the specific matches in
the labour market. We denote V o as the continuation value of an employer when he has an opening
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and V f (θ) as the firm’s continuation value when the position is filled with a worker characterized by
productivity θ.
In a period where the firm position is filled the employer obtains a net profit (1− τ)(θ − w). With
probability 1 − δ this profitable match persists and the employer obtains V f (θ) tomorrow (discounted
by β). If not (with probability δ), the match breaks and so the employer has an opening tomorrow and
obtains V o. Bringing these elements together we have:
V f (θ) =(1− τ)(θ − w) + (1− δ)βV f (θ) + δβV o
⇔ V f (θ) =(1− τ)(θ − w) + δβV
o
1− β(1− δ) (1)
When a firm has an opening it does not produce, its profit is zero in this period, and the employer
only receives transfers. It is then matched with an unemployed worker with productivity θ and must
decide whether to hire him and so obtain a payoff next period of V f (θ). If not, the position remains
unfilled and the employer’s continuation value is V o. Thus, when she has an opening, the employer’s
continuation value is




V f (θ), V o
} )
(2)
Of course, when the employer has an opening he does not know with which worker he will be matched.
Further since the productivity is match-specific, the relevant distribution is the ex-ante distribution of
productivity (i.e., S(·)).
Obviously, employers never employ a worker with productivity less than w since it always leads to
negative revenue. Less obvious is that frictions in the labour market might lead to an an employer
foregoing profit. Specifically, she faces a trade-off between enjoying profit θ − w > 0 today and missing
out on a more productive worker (θ′ > θ) tomorrow. If a worker’s productivity is too close to w, the loss
in term of future opportunity dominates that from the immediate profit that would be lost. Hence, an
employer hires a worker if and only if his productivity θ is above a hiring threshold θND, strictly greater
than the wage w.8
Having shown that these value functions are well defined, and building on the arguments presented
here, straightforward analysis provides the following result:
8We note that even if matches are not persistent, employers only hire workers who generate a strictly positive profit
(in formal terms, lim
δ→1
θND > w). This is due to the timing of labour market interactions. If a hire takes place in period
t, production only starts in period t + 1. Hence, even if matches break after the producing period t + 1, there is an
opportunity cost to hire a low productivity worker (just above w).
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Lemma 1. When social identity is not salient, in the unique equilibrium:
(i) A worker always accepts to enter in a working relationship;
(ii) There exists a hiring threshold θND ∈ (w, 1) such that an employer hires a worker if and only if
θ ≥ θND.
We now turn to the labour market equilibria when social identity is salient. When this is so, all
actors might simply ignore social identity and play the same strategy as before (when social traits are
not salient): An equilibrium without work discrimination always exists. Alternatively, workers and
employers might condition their labour decisions on social identity. There are many reasons to focus
on this particular assessment. First, Peski and Szentes (2013) and Rose´n (1997) both show in distinct
settings that a non-discriminatory equilibrium is not stable when identity can serve as a focal point
(though it is not clear whether this property holds in our set-up). Second, if social identity has no
implication for labour market outcomes, no candidate would ever propose policies that make it salient.
Indeed, recall that when indifferent, citizens oppose the implementation of such policy (citizens’ electoral
choice can be understood as a form of forward-looking behavior). Thus to understand why they are
proposed, we look at the situation when the labour market is affected by policies that raise the salience
of social identity.
What does a labour market shaped by social identity look like? Salient social identity generates
a fully segregated labour market. Workers with majority social trait accept job offers from employers
with the same identity. Likewise, employers with majority social trait only hire workers from their own
majority group. Workers with majority social identity all face the same payoff from accepting a job offer.
Hence, if one of them is willing to work for a firm owned by an employer with minority social trait, all
would be willing to do so: the labour market would look identical to that under the non-discrimination
equilibrium. Similarly, if majority firms hire minority workers while majority workers refuse to work
with minority firms, then with probability a.e. one the proportion of either minority workers or majority
employers would drop to zero over time. Hence, in the steady state, identity could no longer play a role.
Given its consequences on hiring, we refer to equilibria in which identity serves the role of focal point
in the labour market subgame as ‘discrimination equilibria.’
How do employers behave in the labour market subgame in a discrimination equilibrium? As in the
non-discrimination equilibrium, firms hire workers if and only if their productivity is above a certain
threshold. However, employers with distinct identities use different hiring thresholds. When matched
with a worker who shares the same social trait, an employer faces the familiar trade-off between profit
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today and the opportunity cost of missing out on a better match tomorrow. The opportunity cost,
however, now depends on the proportion of workers with the same identity among the unemployed.
To see the effect of discrimination on labor market outcome,denote V fJ,K(θ) the continuation value
of an employer with physical trait J ∈ {M,m} and social trait K ∈ {M,m} when the position is filled
(f) by an employee with productivity θ and similar social identity. Using this notation, and following
the steps in our earlier construction (of value functions for a world absent discrimination), we obtain
the following continuation value function:
V fJ,K(θ) = (1− τ)(θ − w) + (1− δ)βV fJ,K(θ) + δβV oJ,K . (3)
Note that since we focus on the continuation value when the employee has similar social trait, the
employer never changes social identity upon separation. This expression includes V oJ,K which denotes
the continuation value should the employer’s position becomes open (an event with probability δ). In
a discrimination equilibrium, the continuation value depends upon the proportion of workers who share
the employers identity. Correspondingly, we write the probability that an employer is matched with a
majority unemployed worker as µM . Thus the relevant value functions for an employer with (physical
and social) traits J ∈ {M,m} and with an open position are given by:
V oM,M =0 + µ
MβEθ max{V fM,M(θ), V oM,M}+ β(1− µM)V oM,M (4)
V om,m =0 + (1− µM)βEθ max{V fm,m(θ), V om,m}+ βµMV om,m (5)
Since a majority-trait employer only hires majority workers, his status can change (from open to
filled position) only if he meets a majority worker (i.e., with probability µM). In turn, a minority-trait
employer’s position can become filled only if he is matched with a minority worker (i.e., with probability
1− µM).
As before, an employer uses a cutoff strategy: hires if and only if θ ≥ θDM (θ ≥ θ
D
m) for a majority
(minority) employer. Since the pool of potential matches is not evenly balanced except in knife-edge
cases, employers with different identities almost always use different thresholds. Because employers only
hire workers with the same identity as their own, the pool of potential employees is always smaller with
than without discrimination. As a consequence, both types of employer become more lenient in their
hiring and so their hiring thresholds are strictly lower than when social identity is not salient. The
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proportion of unemployed with majority or minority traits, in turn, depends on the hiring thresholds
adopted by firms. In equilibrium, unemployment rates for both types of workers and the hiring thresholds
for both types of firms must be consistent with each other. Despite this complicated fixed point problem,
we show that the equilibrium is unique. Lemma 2 details the key features of labour market strategies
in this unique discrimination equilibrium.
Lemma 2. When social identity is salient, in any discrimination equilibrium, labour market strategies
satisfy:
(i) A worker with a majority social identity only agrees to work with an employer with a majority social
identity;
(ii) An employer with a majority social identity never hires a worker with a minority social identity;
(iii) There exists a unique pair of hiring thresholds θDM(α
W , αF ), θDm(α
W , αF ) ∈ (w, θND)2 such that
• an employer with majority social identity hires a worker with majority social identity if and only
if θ ≥ θDM(αW , αF );
• an employer with minority social identity hires a worker with minority social identity if and only
if θ ≥ θDm(αW , αF ).
The hiring thresholds are a function of all parameters. For our purpose, their dependence on the
proportions of workers with majority physical (and thus social) identity, αW , and of employers with
majority physical trait, αF , are of key importance. Corollary 1 shows that the comparative statics with
respect to these two parameters conform with straightforward intuition.
As the proportion of workers with majority identity increases, employers with majority traits are
more likely to be matched with workers of the same type. As a result, they become more strict in their
hiring decision: the hiring threshold strictly increases with αW . In contrast, employers with minority
identity are less likely to be matched with a worker from with minority social trait and so the hiring
threshold of these firms decreases with αW . In the limit, if all workers come from the majority, type-
M employers are certain to be matched with workers of the same type and thus use the same hiring
threshold as absent discrimination (θND). Employers with minority trait are very unlikely to find anyone
who accepts their job offer and so hire any profitable worker with identity m.
An increase in the proportion of employers with majority identity has the reverse effect on the hiring
thresholds. A greater αF implies that more workers with majority identity are already employed so
the unemployed pool contains relatively more type-m workers. For employers with majority traits, the
chances of obtaining a better match in the future decreases and they become more lenient in their
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employment decision. For employers with minority trait, the chances increase and they become more
strict in their hiring decision.
Corollary 1. In the unique discrimination equilibrium, the hiring thresholds θDM(α
W , αF ) and θDm(α
W , αF )
satisfy the following properties:
(i) the hiring threshold of employers with majority social identity (θDM(α
W , αF )) is strictly increasing
with the proportion of workers with majority identity (αW ) and strictly decreasing with the proportion
of employers with majority identity (αF );
(ii) the hiring threshold of employers with minority social identity (θDm(α
W , αF )) is strictly decreasing
with the proportion of workers with majority identity (αW ) and strictly increasing with the proportion




W , αF ) = θND and lim
αW→1
θDm(α
W , αF ) = w.
Having characterized the labor market participants’ strategies in the discrimination equilibrium in
Lemma 2, henceforth the ‘discrimination strategy,’ we now turn to describing the conditions such that
these strategies are mutual best responses. For this to be so, two conditions need to be satisfied: 1)
a worker with majority trait refuses any job offer from an employer with minority identity and 2) an
employer with majority identity always refuses to hire a worker with minority trait.
The first condition holds if a worker’s present benefit of being employed by a type-m employer is
higher than the future loss from being ostracized by employers with the majority trait (if the worker
changes social identity). Being ostracised by majority employers is not always disadvantageous to the
type-M worker. It depends critically on the proportion of these workers relative to the proportion of
type-M employers. When there are few majority firms and many majority workers, (with discrimination)
majority workers are likely to suffer unemployment. Then, paradoxically, workers with minority social
identity experience relatively favorable labor market prospects.
It follows that workers with majority trait suffer a loss from being tainted by the minority only
if their proportion relative to the percentage of type-M employers is not too high: formally, αW is
below a population threshold αW (αF ); when not, a worker with majority trait gains from switching
social identities and so refusing a job offer from a type-m employers is never an equilibrium strategy. In
contrast, when αW < αW (αF ), so that workers with majority identity have better employment prospects,
the anticipated cost of being ostracised always dominates provided workers are sufficiently patient and
the majority worker, then, turns down the opportunity to work for a type-m employer.
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The second condition mirrors the first with respect to the employment decisions of type-M employers.
It requires that the present benefit of hiring a type-M worker with maximum productivity (θ = 1) is
strictly lower than the loss induced from being ostracized by type-M workers in the future (if the
employer changes social identity). Again, an employer does not always face a cost from belonging to the
social minority. Indeed, if the proportion of employers with majority trait is very high compared to the
percentage of workers from the same group, type-M firms are unlikely to be matched with workers with
the same traits are most are already employed. Since most unemployed workers belong to the minority
group, hiring is relatively easier for employers with minority social identity.
Thus employers with majority trait suffer a loss from being tainted by the minority only if their
proportion relative to the percentage of type-M workers is not too high: formally, αW is above a
population threshold αW (αF ). When this condition is not satisfied, an employer with majority trait
gains from switching identity and refusing to hire a sufficiently productive type-m workers is never
an equilibrium strategy. By contrast, when αW > αW (αF ), so firms with majority traits have better
prospects of filling their position, the future loss always dominates the present benefit of hiring a very
productive type-m workers provided employers are sufficiently patient.
Bringing this reasoning together, we obtain a necessary condition for the existence of the discrimina-
tion equilibrium: the proportion of workers with majority identity relative to the percentage of employers
with the same trait is intermediary (not too high and not too low).9
Proposition 1 summarizes our findings and Figure 1 illustrates them.
Proposition 1. For all proportions of employers with majority identity αF ∈ (1/2, 1), there exists two
unique population thresholds αW (αF ), αW (αF ) ∈ (1/2, αF )×(αF , 1] such that if the proportion of workers
with majority identity satisfies αW ∈ (αW (αF ), αW (αF )), there exists β < 1 such that for all β ≥ β,
workers’ and employers’ discrimination strategies are mutual best response.
The two population thresholds (as well as the lower bound on the discount factor β) depend on
all model parameters. In particular, they depend on the percentage of employers with majority trait
αF . As shown in Figure 1, both αW (·) and αW (·) increase with the proportion of employers exhibiting
majority traits. The logic is similar to previous results. Higher αF implies that unemployed workers
with identity M are more likely to be matched with the right type of firms. Hence, these workers
9The lower and upper bounds are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the population thresholds satisfy αW (αF ) < αF <
αW (αF ). Given the greater proportion of type-M employers and workers (αF > 1/2 and αW > 1/2), workers and
employers with majority identity have greater chances of being matched together than their minority counterparts when
αW = αF . A type-M workers then refuse a type-m employer’s job offer and a type-M employers never hire a type-m
workers as long as they are sufficiently patient.
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Figure 1: Labour market discrimination
The black plain curves labeled ‘Employers’ and ‘Workers’ depict αW (αF ) and αW (αF ), respectively. The dashed blue
line is αF . The shaded gray area correspond to proportions of type-M workers and employers such that discrimination
strategies are mutual best responses (for appropriate β). Parameter values: w = 0.3, δ = 0.2.
have greater incentives to refuse a job offer from an employer with minority trait so the upper bound
αW (αF ) increases. Higher αF also implies that more type-M employers compete for the same pool of
workers making it more attractive to hire a worker with minority trait so the lower bound αW (αF )
increases as well. If employers with majority trait barely constitute a majority, type-M workers have
very little incentive to reject a type-m employer’s offer, and type-M employers little incentive not to
hire a (sufficiently productive) type-m workers. Hence, both thresholds converge to 1/2 as firms become
evenly split between majority and minority.
Corollary 2. The thresholds αW (αF ) and αW (αF ) satisfy the following properties:
(i) αW (αF ) and αW (αF ) are strictly increasing with αF ;
(ii) lim
αF→1/2
αW (αF ) = 1/2 = lim
αF→1/2
αW (αF );
(iii) There exists a unique α̂F < 1 such that αW (αF ) = 1 for all αF ≥ α̂F ;
(iv) lim
aF→1
αW (αF ) < 1.
The discrimination strategies we describe in Lemma 2 generates some interesting empirical patterns
when they constitute an equilibrium. First, workers with minority traits suffer from higher unemploy-
ment rates and longer spells of unemployment than their type-M counterparts. In turn, because in
equilibrium employers with majority traits must find it easier to hire than their minority counterparts,
type-M employers are more discerning in their hiring: their hiring threshold is strictly higher than that
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of type-m employers’. As a result, firms owned by employers with majority identity are more productive,
on average.
Proposition 2 summarizes the observable labour market characteristics of the discrimination equilib-
rium, when it exists.
Proposition 2. In the unique discrimination equilibrium,
(i) the unemployment rate and duration of unemployment spell are strictly higher for workers with
minority trait than workers with majority trait;
(ii) a firm’s average productivity when producing is strictly higher when it is owned by an employer with
majority trait than when it is owned by an employer with minority trait.
Although these outcomes do not stem from statistical discrimination, they are consistent with empir-
ical observations that could inform reasoning that is akin to statistical discrimination: the higher output
of majority owned firms is due to their employment of majority workers with high levels of productivity
and the low productivity of minority owned firms is related to lower productivity amongst their minority
employees. However, here, the observed correlation between identity, attributes and outcomes is entirely
spurious. Differential firm outputs are not related to differences in productivity/human capital invest-
ments between groups in the general population. Instead they are generated by different endogenous
employment thresholds deployed by majority and minority owned firms in equilibrium.
The results described above are robust to a change in the labor market. In Appendix A, we show
that the necessary conditions that we characterize in Proposition 1 (and illustrate in Figure 1) remain
unchanged in a labor market where employers with majority trait can hire for free a minority worker or
where workers with majority trait can be offered a minority-owned firm’s full profit when matched (see
Proposition A.1 for details). The intuition is quite simple. The thresholds on αW guarantee that the
future cost for type-M employers and workers from being ostracized is strictly positive. If actors expect
others to play a discrimination strategy, these costs remain the same for the majority no matter what
the minority does since the labor market is fully segregated. Thus, we can always find a sufficiently high
discount factor such that these future costs dominate any present benefit and discrimination strategies
remain mutual best responses.
We conclude this section by highlighting our main finding thus far. Even when all types of workers
and all types of employers are identical ex-ante, raising the salience of social identity sets in motion
forces that lead to a fully segregated labour market. This, in turn, can lead to workers from different
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groups in society experiencing very different economic circumstances according to their shared identity.
And it can lead to different patterns of production according to the identity of the firm owner.
That social identity can yield segregation has a long history. For example, in the Middle Ages,
the Cagots suffered from total segregation. As Appiah (2018, p.28) describes, “the Cagots [of French
and Spanish Pyrene´es] were for a millennium treated as pariahs, relegated to disfavoured districts, even
forced to use separate doors in churches, where they received the Communion water at the end of a
stick.” While it is hard to determine the cause of this discrimination, the fear of identity transmission
seemed to have played a key role. Appiah continues (emphasis added) “[b]ecause contact with the Cagots
was contaminating, they were severely punished for drinking from the same water basin as others, for
farming, or even walking barefoot on the streets.” More recently, in Austria, Muslims seem to have been
fully separated from the rest of the population after the entry of the far-right party FPO¨ into government
and the implementation of several symbolic laws targeting this minority. As Professor Mahmud Yavuz
describes, “Young people who want to help this country proper are cast aside. The gap is growing.
Nobody wants to have contacts with us. Before neighbors used to come to open days at the mosque,
not any more” (from news article “En Autriche, il ne fait pas bon tre musulman,” Le Monde, May 17th
2019, authors’ translation).
Recent studies also highlight how exogenous events or policies that arguably raise the salience of
identity traits can have far-reaching consequences. Zussman (2013) documents that increased tension
between Palestinians and Israeli breeds intolerance in the interactions with members of the out-group in
the private used car market. Glover (2019) shows how the Charlie Hebdo attack in France in January
2015 significantly lowered employers’ demand for Muslim workers and Muslim workers’ job searching
effort. Quite consistent with our theory, the effect is driven by communities exhibiting a lower ex-ante
bias against minorities (as proxied by the far-right Front National’s vote share). Abdelgadir and Fouka
(2019) looks at the impact of the headscarf ban in 2004 on the achievements of minority pupils. Muslim
girls see a decrease in their secondary educational attainment (lower completion rate, higher drop-out
rates) and experience greater racism following the law.
While not about labor market outcomes, Abdelgadir and Fouka’s findings stress that a symbolic
policy like the headscarf ban can have adverse consequences for the minority as a whole, not just the
small proportion of Muslim pupils directly targeted by the measure. They also show that the salience of
social identity is not exogenous; it requires politicians to create an environment where identity matters.
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And for this to be so requires that it is in politician’s interests to do so. To determine when this condition
is satisfied, we analyse the electoral competition stage of our framework.
5 Electoral competition
We have seen that when identity is salient to people’s choices then labor discrimination that disadvan-
tages minorities can occur in equilibrium. For policies that make identity salient to be introduced it
must be that at least part of the citizenry favours outcomes associated with a segregated labour market.
That is, some citizens must obtain a strictly higher ex-ante expected welfare (the adequate criterion
since the electoral competition precedes the labour market) due to discrimination. The section of the
population that stands to gain the most from labour market discrimination are those workers with ma-
jority traits. When will they demand the introduction of policy that facilitates discriminatory labour
market outcomes in equilibrium?
Note that discrimination is not without costs even for majority workers. With discrimination they
(the type-M workers) must refuse to work with type-m employers (Lemma 2). Without discrimination,
they can enter working relationships with all types of employers. There are also fiscal consequences,
since labour market discrimination induces lower transfers. Recall, from the previous section, that firms
are less selective when it comes to hiring with discrimination (i.e., θND > θDM > θ
D
m) and so firms with
filled positions are less productive. Firms are also less likely to produce (indeed, it is because of the
reduced opportunity to produce that firms are less demanding when hiring). These joint effects (lower
productivity and lower proportion of firms producing) imply that the total amount available for taxation
is lower.
Two conditions are thus necessary for workers to support the introduction of symbolic policies that
alter the dynamics of the labor market. The loss from restricted employment opportunities (due to
being less likely to be matched to an appropriate employer) must be strictly lower than the gain from
the increased likelihood of being hired by an employer with majority identity. This condition is satisfied
when the proportion of type-M firms αF is large compared to the proportion of workers with majority
trait αW—i.e., αW must be below a threshold denoted α̂W (αF ). The loss in term of tax transfers must
also not be too large. This is so when transfers are not too sensitive to change in tax revenues from
labour income. That is, the function K(·) does not increase too fast. Since K(·) is concave, this is
equivalent to K ′(0) not being too large: an interpretation is that large inefficiency in redistribution
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and/or the existence of other tax revenues diminishes the importance of labour taxation (recall that we
do not impose K(0) = 0).
Assuming (for now) that discrimination strategies are mutual best responses, we thus obtain the
following necessary conditions for type-M workers to demand the introduction of symbolic policies such
as the Burkini ban.
Proposition 3. For all proportion of employers with majority identity αF ∈ (1/2, 1), there exists a
unique population threshold α̂W (αF ) ∈ [1/2, αF ) such that if the proportion of workers with majority
identity satisfies αW ∈ (1/2, α̂W (αF )) (possibly an empty interval), there exists an upper bound K > 0
such that workers with majority identity demand the symbolic policy whenever the marginal effect of
labour income taxation on transfers satisfies K ′(0) < K.
One property of the population threshold α̂W (αF ) is worth highlighting. The demand for social
discrimination is positive only if the proportion of workers with majority identity is strictly lower than
the proportion of employers with the same identity (i.e., α̂W (αF ) < αF ). Hence, social discrimination
is possible only if the minority is poorly integrated economically in this sense.
The intuition for this condition again involves the loss due to reduced employment opportunities:
with discrimination, workers with majority traits no longer compete with type-m workers for positions
offered by employers with majority identity but they also abandon the opportunity to work with type-m
employers. If the proportion of types is the same among workers and employers, the ratio of jobs to
workers is the same (one-to-one) with or without work discrimination. Type-M workers are, however,
less likely to be matched with a firm that will employ them (since they exclude employers with minority
identity). Employers’ adjusted hiring practices (hiring threshold θDM instead of θ
ND) are not sufficient
to compensate for such lower employment prospects. Although firms take into account the reduced
likelihood of being matched with type-M workers, they also consider the possibility of meeting a more
productive adequate employee tomorrow. A necessary condition for workers with majority trait to benefit
from discrimination is, thus, that the jobs to workers ratio becomes favorable (αW < αF ) and employers
with majority identity become sufficiently lenient in their hiring decisions (recall from Corollary 1 that
θDM decreases with α
F ).
The population threshold α̂W (αF ) exhibits other important properties. Intuitively, the upper bound
on the demand for social discrimination is less stringent as the proportion of type-M employers increases.
Since then workers with majority identity are more likely to be matched with the right type of employer,
they benefit more from the labour market opportunities with discrimination. In the limit when all
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employers exhibit majority traits, type-M worker always gain income from work discrimination since
they face reduced competition for open positions. We thus obtain:
Corollary 3. The population threshold α̂W (αF ) satisfies the following properties:
(i) α̂W (αF ) is increasing with αF , strictly if α̂W (αF ) > 1/2;
(ii) lim
αF→1
α̂W (αF ) = 1.
We have established conditions such that a majority of workers benefit from workplace discrimination
and so will demand policies that facilitate such discrimination. Next we turn to the supply side and
consider candidates’ behavior. It is useful for this purpose to define the following two quantities: Let
τND be the preferred tax rate of workers in the absence of work discrimination; and, in turn, let τDJ be
the preferred tax rate of workers with identity J ∈ {M,m} with discrimination. Notice that employers
do not receive any transfer so their preferred tax rate is always 0.
Observe that candidates’ problem is two-dimensional: they must choose a tax rate and a position on
the symbolic dimension. While multi-dimensional electoral competition models are often intractable, we
can take advantage of the binary nature of the symbolic dimension (offer or not the symbolic policy) and
the shared interest of each separate group of voters (majority workers, minority workers, majority citizen
employers, minority citizen firm owners) to establish the following properties of equilibrium platforms.
In equilibrium, candidates propose one of two platforms. Candidates either do not offer the symbolic




Lemma 3. In equilibrium, candidates converge to the same platform. Further, for all J ∈ {A,B},
candidate J ’s platform satisfies either (dJ , τJ) = (0, τ
ND) or (dJ , τJ) = (1, τ
D
M).
The classic dynamics of spatial politics explains this result. Any candidate proposing a platform
(0, τ), with τ 6= τND, faces certain defeat. Indeed, if his opponent offers (0, τND), he gathers the votes of
all workers, a plurality of the citizenry since 1 > f , and wins the election. Hence, by the usual logic, any
candidate who is elected proposing no symbolic policy must also be proposing workers’ preferred tax
rate. Similarly, any candidate J ∈ {A,B} proposing a platform (1, τ) with τ 6= τDM , is certain to lose. If
τ > τDM , his opponent by offering (1, τ
D
M) forms a winning electoral coalition consisting of workers with
majority traits and all employers. If τ < τDM , his opponent by offering (1, τ
D
M) forms a winning electoral
coalition consisting of all workers. Indeed, since with social identity salient, workers with minority
identity experience worse labour market outcomes than their majority counterparts (Proposition 2),
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they favour a higher tax rate than τDM and so would vote for (1, τ
D
M) over any platform (1, τ) with
τ < τDM . Hence, by the usual logic, any candidate who is elected proposing the symbolic policy must
also be offering the tax rate preferred by type-M workers.
We are now ready to determine when the existence of the discrimination equilibrium, or equivalently
conditions under which both candidates propose the symbolic policy. Two conditions need to be satisfied:
1) discrimination strategies are mutual best responses and 2) a plurality of the citizenry demands social
discrimination; that is, prefers (1, τDM) to (0, τ
ND) by Lemma 3. To satisfy jointly these two conditions,
it is necessary that the proportion of type-M workers relative to the proportion of type-M employers
be intermediary: αW ∈ (αW (αF ), α̂W (αF )) (see Propositions 1 and 3)). In particular, note that the
upper bound is determined by the political demand. Indeed, for discrimination to be a best response,
type-M workers compare their labour situation as an advantaged majority compared to a discriminated
minority. When considering the demand for discrimination, type-M workers compare their ex-ante
welfare (including lower transfer) with and without discrimination. The second intuitively is a more
stringent condition.
A positive demand for social discrimination is not sufficient, demand must be sufficiently large so
that candidates offer the symbolic policy. If type-M workers are a sufficient mass (αW > (1+f)/2), this
is guaranteed. If not, it must be that employers with majority identity side with workers with the same
trait. Majority firm owners indeed face a trade-off between accepting lower productivity, but also lower
taxation with discrimination. While we cannot exclude the possibility that employers with majority
identity favors the symbolic policy, we cannot prove it either. The reason is that the hiring thresholds
described in Lemmas 1 and 2 are only implicitly defined making it hard to compare employers’ expected
payoffs across equilibria.
The properties of the population thresholds αW (αF ) (Corollary 1) and α̂W (αF ) (Corollary 3) guar-
antee that all necessary conditions can be satisfied simultaneously whenever the proportion of type-M
employers (αF ) is sufficiently large. We thus obtain the following proposition which summarizes (suf-
ficient) conditions on the population and other parameters for the symbolic policy to be implemented
and social discrimination to be observed in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium is the discrimination equilibrium with both candidates A and B offering
the symbolic policy d = 1 and a tax rate of τ = τDM when:
(a) the proportion of employers with majority identity satisfies αF ∈ (αF , 1) for some threshold αF ∈
(1/2, 1);
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(b) the proportion of workers with majority identity satisfies αW ∈ (αW (αF ), α̂W (αF ));
(c) Workers and employers are sufficiently patient: β > β;
(d) The marginal effect of labour income taxation on transfers is sufficient low: K ′(0) < K.
Figure 2: Labour market discrimination
The black plain curve labeled ‘Employers’ depicts αW (αF ). The curve labeled ‘Demand’ depicts α̂W (αF ). The horizontal
line labeled ‘Supply’ depicts 1+f2 . The shaded purple area correspond to proportions of type-M workers and employers
such that discrimination is an equilibrium outcome (for appropriate β and K ′(0)). Parameter values: w = 0.3, δ = 0.2,
f = 0.3.
Figure 2 illustrates the conditions detailed in Proposition 4. In equilibrium, symbolic policies are
introduced only if the proportion of minority workers is sizeable (so there is a benefit from labour
discrimination), but not too important (so it cannot block discrimination through democratic means).
Further, it is necessary that the minority is poorly integrated economically (i.e., αF > αF and αW < αF ).
While we cannot directly test whether these conditions are satisfied, a look at demographic statistics
suggests that they are not completely unrealistic. The Muslim population in Europe is estimated to
amount to 8.8% of the Austrian population (Austrian census), 6% of Belgians, 5% in Germany, 4.7% in
Great Britain (Dancygier, 2017, 12 footnote 33). There are few statistics available on firms owned by
employers with minority identity. Nevertheless, there seems to be agreement that many minorities are
under-represented in several European countries. For example, self-employment is lower for Turks than
for natives in Germany European Commission (2008). In Great Britain, the reverse holds true with a
greater proportion of Pakistani and Indian minorities than White British choosing self-employment Ram
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and Jones (2008). This does not falsify our findings—far from it–since Great Britain is an exception in
that the U.K. has not (yet) experienced policies of the form of burqa or hijab bans.
Our last set of results details the consequences of symbolic policies. To do so, we compare equilib-
rium outcomes when identity is salient and social discrimination occurs to those when it is not. This
comparison is adequate for two complementary reasons. First, countries are in either one regime or the
other and so such a contrast corresponds to testable empirical predictions. Second, when identity is not
salient, observable quantities arising in the unique equilibrium do not depend on the share of workers
and employers with majority traits they only depend on the distribution of skills which is kept constant
throughout). As a consequence, equilibrium outcomes when identity is not salient provide the correct
counterfactual: they correspond to what would have happened were the conditions in Proposition 4 met
but symbolic policies not implemented.
The next proposition establishes the large economic consequences of symbolic policies such as those
mentioned in our introductory remarks. First, as a result of the discrimination that follows their intro-
duction overall production is lower as firms are less likely to be matched with workers they can hire.
Second, the consequent discrimination increases unemployment rate of minorities who are now excluded
from most jobs. Third, even though they are orthogonal to symbolic policy, redistributive transfers are
strictly lower with than without discrimination. This follows from the the lower production which leads
to less income available from taxation, but not only. Workers with majority traits, unlike their minority
counterparts, experience better labour market prospects under discrimination. Thus, taxation is rela-
tively more costly for them. This implies that the change in tax rates τDM does not fully compensate
the lower tax base. Higher labour market income can even induce workers with majority identity to
demand lower taxation when symbolic policies are introduced than they would in their absence (e.g., if
transfers are not too sensitive to labour income taxation at the margin).
Proposition 5. Compared to the unique equilibrium when symbolic policies are not introduced and there
is no discrimination, in the discrimination equilibrium
(i) Total production is strictly lower;
(ii) The employment rate of workers with majority social identity is strictly higher,
(ii’) The employment rate of workers with minority social identity is strictly lower;
(iii) Redistributive transfers are weakly lower, strictly if τND > 0;
(iv) Further, if the elasticity of the marginal effect of labour income taxation on transfers is less than
one in absolute values, then the tax rate is also weakly lower, strictly if τND > 0.
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Proposition 5 highlights that workers with majority traits are generally the only beneficiaries of
discrimination (though as mentioned above, we cannot exclude that type-M employers may also gain
from it). Social discrimination is thus best understood as a transfer from the rest of the population
to the native working class majority. Workers with minority identity are, in turn, severely negatively
affected. They see their employment prospects reduced and their non-labour income diminished. That
is, even though transfers are uniformly redistributed to the working population, workers with minority
traits get less assistance when they need it the most.
This negative relationship between symbolic policies raising the salience of identity traits and redistri-
bution has received some anecdotal and empirical support. Anecdotally, during the French presidential
campaign, Marine Le Pen played both the identity card (France for French first) and promised a 10%
tax cut. Empirically, Alt and Iversen (2017) show that labor market segmentation along ethnic lines is
a strong predictor of lower support for redistribution.
6 Summary and discussion
Discussing the causes of ethnic conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2000, 857) remark that “political elites
use violence to construct antagonistic ethnic identities, which in turn favour more violence” with the
masses following. Our paper shows that this phenomenon is not limited to weakly institutionalized
environments. In democracies, politicians use social discrimination to construct antagonistic social
identities, which in turn favour labor market discrimination. They do so when such policies are supported
by the native working class (who form a majority) who can benefit from these labour effects. The labor
market discrimination we document is not due to overt prejudice. In our theoretical framework, there
is no room for taste-based discrimination. The labor market discrimination we describe is not caused
by difference in human capital of workers. All workers are ex-ante identical so there is no room for
statistical discrimination. Rather, labor market discrimination is sustained by anticipations about what
others would do if a majority worker/employer interacts with a minority employer/worker. It is rooted
in expectations about others’ behaviors rather than preferences or beliefs (for experimental evidence on
the importance of expectations, see Daskalova, 2018). As such, the discrimination our paper analyses is
best understood as social discrimination.
This form of discrimination has dramatic consequences. In equilibrium, the labor market is segre-
gated. Large differences emerge in the employment patterns of minority and majority workers and in the
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productivity of majority and minority owned firms. These labour market effects are magnified by fiscal
policies that further erode minority welfare: when they need it most, minority workers unable to find
employment in the segregated market receive lower redistributive transfers even though revenues from
taxation are uniformly redistributed. The economic impact of policies that evoke discrimination have
negative consequences for the economy as a whole. The segregated labour market reduces the likelihood
that firms find adequate workers and overall production. While majority workers are beneficiaries of
policy that invoke discrimination, via better employment prospects, this labour gain translates into
lower demand for redistribution that further hurts minorities. In short, the annoyance that minorities
might face upon the introduction of policies such as a burka or beef ban is nothing compared to the
broader impact of such policies that simultaneously erode their career prospects and their safety net.
Our predictions regarding when social discrimination arises have consequences for evaluating natives’
reactions to minorities or to immigration. Rather than looking at the size of the minority to determine
whether the majority becomes more tolerant via contact or radicalises due to threat, our paper suggests
that it is critical to take into account the composition of the minority. When the minority is mostly
composed of workers, then discrimination becomes more likely; when it is made of employers, then the
risk of discrimination recedes (for qualitative evidence consistent with this prediction, see Dancygier,
2010). Further, even the concept of threat may need revision. Natives or majority members may favour
policies targeting the minority because of the gain from future job prospects associated with a segregated
labor market.
Social discrimination does not just have redistributive consequences, it also reduces the size of the
whole pie. This has two important implications. First, it suggests that economic arguments, such as
the detrimental impact on growth of some discriminatory policies, are unlikely to be persuasive (e.g.,
the failure of the so-called ‘Project Fear’ in the Brexit referendum, an event which, arguably, changed
the perception of Eastern European migrants, e.g. Rzepnikowska, 2019). Our paper shows that the
majority of voters (workers with majority traits) may find the overall adverse economic consequences
unimportant as long as the policy benefits them personally. Second, the shrinking of the pie suggests
a normative rationale to restrict the possibility of implementing policies raising the salience of identity
for discriminatory purposes.
Our paper provides an analysis of the social discrimination that arises due symbolic policies. What
then are the policies that can counteract social discrimination? A clear (though not simple) policy
recommendation to limit the attractiveness of symbolic policies or any policy triggering labor market
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segregation via social discrimination. As noted in Proposition 3, there is a demand for social discrimi-
nation only if the minority is poorly integrated economically. Favouring entrepreneurship by migrants
and people from ethnic minorities does not just represent an economic opportunity European Commis-
sion (2008). It is also a defence against policies that have the potential to hurt the economy. Another
solution would be to impose quotas within firms for minority workers. This form of affirmative action in
the workplace may be beneficial not so much because it improves the employment prospect of minority
workers, but because it reduces the risk that the labor market is segregated. As such, our theoretical
framework suggests a novel argument for policies imposing some diversity in the workplace. A probably
even less popular policy to fight social discrimination would be to open the country to immigration and,
especially, naturalisation. Increasing the share of minority workers makes it harder to sustain discrimi-
nation strategies as mutual best responses (see Proposition 1 and Figure 1) and decreases the electoral
incentives to propose symbolic policies.
More generally, our paper offers a word of caution for policy-makers seeking to reduce the possibility
of discrimination against minorities. The effectiveness of a policy much depends on the type of discrim-
ination politicians wish to target. Besides well-known forms of discrimination–such as taste-based or
statistical discrimination–our paper highlights an additional one, namely social discrimination. Policies
effective in fighting one type of discrimination may reinforce another. Take the diversity-compliant label
to firms with diverse workforce proposed by Adida, Laitin, and Valfort (2016, 157). This measure may
be effective in combatting statistical discrimination, while having perverse consequences when it comes
to social discrimination (raising the salience of identity or increasing the probability of identity trans-
mission). Similarly, workplace affirmative action may help limit social and statistical discrimination,
but might raise resentment and thus worsens discrimination that is fundamentally taste-based.
The last observation suggests that identifying the source of discrimination is of primary importance
for policy purposes.10 For example, the empirical patterns resulting from social discrimination we de-
scribe in Proposition 2 are inconsistent with statistical discrimination against workers with minority
traits (firms owned by minority employers should be more productive since they could hire majority and
minority workers), taste-based discrimination by employers (same effect) or taste-based discrimination
by workers with majority traits (minority workers would have better employment prospect being hired
10Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) and Gneezy, List, and Price (2012) use, respectively, laboratory and field experiments
to distinguish between statistical and taste-based discriminations and find little evidence in favor of the latter. Evidence
that is consistent with statistical discrimination is also presented by Glover, Pallais, and Pariente (2017) who analyzed the
performance of cashiers distinguished by majority or minority identity in a French grocery store chain. They show that
manager bias negatively affects minority job performance and when working with unbiased managers, minority workers
perform substantially better than non-minorities.
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by majority and minority employers). On the other hand, the observables we uncover are not inconsis-
tent with all citizens with majority traits being prejudiced against the minority as a whole. Another
interesting avenue for future research is to consider how social discrimination affects integration: does
it lead to more separation (e.g., Carvalho, 2012; Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier, and Zenou, 2016; Fouka,
2019a) or more assimilation (e.g., adoption of the majority names as in Fouka, 2019b)?
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Proofs
A Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1
An employer’s continuation value when his position is filled is given by Equation 1. Equation 1 directly
indicates that V f (θ) is strictly increasing with θ. Hence, there exists a threshold θND ∈ [w, 1] such that
max
{
V f (θ), V o
}
= V f (θ) for all θ ≥ θND. Using the reasoning above, we use Equation 2 to rewrite V o
as:
V o =0 + βES
(
V f (θ)
∣∣θ ≥ θND)(1− S(θND)) + βV o × S(θND)
⇔ V o =βES
(
V f (θ)












(1− τ)(θ − w)dS(θ) + (1− S(θND))βδV o
1− β(1− δ)





(1− τ)(θ − w)dS(θ)
(1− β)(1− β(1− δ) + β(1− S(θND))) (A.2)
Notice further that by definition—assuming for now θND is interior—V f (θND) = V o. So θND is the
solution to:
V f (θND) =V o
⇔ (1− τ)(θND − w) =(1− β)V o
The second equality comes from Equation 1. Now using Equation A.2, we obtain that θND is the solution
to:




1− β(1− δ) + β(1− S(θND)) (A.3)
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Using Equation A.3, one can check that a threshold exists and is indeed always interior. θND = w would
require 0 ≥ β
∫ 1
w(θ−w)dS(θ)
1−β(1−δ)+β(1−S(w)) which is of course impossible. θ
ND = 1 would require 1− w ≤ 0, again a
contradiction. We now show that θND is unique.
Simple rearrangement of Equation A.3 given the employer’s threshold strategy yields:





θ|θ ≥ θND)− w)(1− θND)







1− β(1− δ) + β(1− θND) (A.4)
It can be checked that the left-hand side of Equation A.4 is strictly increasing with θND, whereas the
right-hand side is strictly decreasing. Hence, θND is unique.
The next preliminary lemmas set the ground for the proof of Lemma 2. Throughout, we assume that
discrimination equilibria exist. We prove existence in Proposition 1. In the proofs, we use the shorthand
majority (minority) worker to denote a worker with majority (minority) social identity.
Lemma A.1. In any work discrimination equilibrium,
(i) A worker with a majority social identity only agrees to work with an employer with a majority social
identity;
(ii) An employer with a majority social identity never hires a worker with a minority social identity.
Proof. Under our assumptions (exogenous wage and match-specific productivity), all majority workers
are identical. Hence, if one majority worker agrees to work with a minority employer, all must also
prefer to do so. Since, in turn, a minority worker always agrees to work with both a majority and
minority employers, all workers work with all employers. Hence, a firm has no reason to discriminate.
This proves point (i).
For point (ii), note that give point (i), if (ii) does not hold then the proportion of minority workers or
the proportion of majority employers go to 0 in equilibrium (since we only consider the steady state and
no majority worker works with minority firm so becomes a minority member or changes the identity of
minority firm by (i)), and there is no longer any work discrimination.11
We now detail the properties of a discrimination assessment. That is, we describe the best responses of
workers and employers in the labor market subgame when other players play a discrimination strategy
11As we will also see below, demand for discrimination requires that the share of majority workers and firms be interior.
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(i.e., strategies satisfy the conditions of Lemma A.1). We then determine conditions such that all labor
market actors’ discrimination strategies are mutual best response.
Denote µM the proportion of majority citizen among unemployed workers. Employers when taking their
employment decision takes this proportion as given. Lemma A.2 then shows the hiring best response
takes the form of threshold strategy. We denote V fJ,K(θ) the continuation value of an employer with
physical trait J ∈ {M,m} and social trait K ∈ {M,m} when the position is filled (f) with an employee
with productivity θ. In turn, V oJ,K denotes the continuation value for a similar employer when his position
is open.
Lemma A.2. In a work discrimination assessment, there exists unique θM(µ
M), θm(µ
M) ∈ (w, 1)2 such
that the employers’ best responses as a function of µM satisfy a majority (minority) employer hires a
majority (minority) worker if and only if θ ≥ θM(µM) (θ ≥ θm(µM)).
Further, θM(µ
M) is strictly increasing with µM and θm(µ
M) is strictly decreasing with µM .
Proof. A majority (minority) employer’s continuation value when his position is open is given by Equa-
tion 4 (Equation 5). Observe from the equations in the main text that the key difference between
Equation 2 and Equation 4 is that a majority employer needs to be matched with a majority worker
before considering hiring. In turn, for Equation 5, a minority firm needs to be matched with a minority
worker to have a chance to hire.
As before, an employer uses a cutoff strategy: hires if and only if θ ≥ θM (θ ≥ θm) for a majority
(minority) employer. By the same computations as in the proof of Lemma 1, the majority cutoff is







1− β + β[δ + µM(1− θM)]
(A.5)
As for Lemma 1, the threshold is unique. By the Implicit Function Theorem (for which all conditions
are satisfied), θM(µ
M) is strictly increasing with µM (the right-hand side is strictly increasing with µM
and strictly decreasing with θM , the left-hand side is strictly increasing with θM).







1− β + β[δ + (1− µM)(1− θm)]
(A.6)
By the Implicit Function Theorem, θm(µ
M) is strictly decreasing with µM .
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Lemma A.2 determines the employers’ strategy for some proportion of majority worker among unem-
ployed, µM . In equilibrium, however, µM is endogenous to the employers’ strategy. The next lemmas
show that there exists a unique pair of equilibrium hiring thresholds θM , θm. That is, we want to en-
sure that the problem does not blow out. To determine these equilibrium thresholds, we first look
at the property of µM as a function of the two thresholds, taken as exogenous, as well as some other
comparative statics.
Lemma A.3. In a work discrimination assessment, there exists a unique proportion of majority workers
µM(θM , θm) among the unemployed. Further µ
M(·) is strictly increasing with θM and αW and strictly
decreasing with θm and α
F .
Proof. Before looking at the proportion of majority workers among unemployed, it is useful to look at
the mass of positions filled in majority firms—denoted F fM—and in minority firms—denoted F
f
m. Since
we consider only the labour market steady state, we obtain that F fM and F
f
m must satisfy, respectively:
F fM = (1− δ)F fM + µM(1− S(θM))(αF − F fM)
F fm = (1− δ)F fm + (1− µM)(1− S(θm))((1− αF )− F fm)
On the right-hand side, the first term is the mass of firms which started with a filled position at the
beginning of the period and remains with a filled position at the end; the second term is the mass of
firms that fills their position this period. The equality with the left-side indicates that the mass for both












(1− µM)(1− S(θm)) + δ (A.8)
Observe that the mass of majority (minority) workers equals the mass of majority (minority) filled
positions in a work discrimination equilibrium (since the labour market is completely segregated by
Lemma A.1). Hence, we can write the share of majority workers among the unemployed as:
µM =
αW − F fM(µM)
αW − F fM(µM) +
(
(1− αW )− F fm(µM)
) (A.9)
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To see that a solution to Equation A.9 exists, notice that when µM = 0, the right-hand side Equation A.9
is strictly positive, whereas when µM = 1, the right-hand side is strictly less than 1. By continuity,
a solution exists. To prove uniqueness, notice that using Equation A.7 and Equation A.8, F fM(µ
M) is
strictly increasing with µM and F fm(µ
M) is strictly decreasing with µM (fixing the thresholds). Define





) . The function is strictly decreasing in x and strictly increasing
in y. Putting the results together, the right-hand side of Equation A.9 is strictly decreasing with µM .
The remaining properties follow from the Implicit Function Theorem since the right-hand side is strictly
increasing in θM , strictly decreasing in θm, strictly increasing in α
W , and strictly decreasing in αF .
Our next result establishes that the probability of hiring a majority employee is decreasing with the
strictness of majority employers’ hiring threshold, even if there is a greater proportion of majority
workers among the unemployed as per the previous lemma.
Lemma A.4. In a work discrimination assessment, µM(θM , θm)(1− S(θM)) is strictly decreasing with
θM ; (1− µM(θM , θm))(1− S(θm)) is strictly decreasing with θm.
Proof. We only prove the result for the majority, a similar reasoning holds for the minority. The
proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose µM(θM , θm)(1 − S(θM)) is weakly increasing with θM . By
definition of F fM(µ
M) (Equation A.7), F fM(·) is weakly increasing with θM . This implies that µM(θM , θm)
is weakly decreasing with θM (by Equation A.9 and the Implicit Function Theorem). Consequently,
µM(θM , θm)(1− S(θM)) is strictly decreasing with θM , a contradiction.
The next Lemma proves the existence of the equilibrium hiring threshold (assuming existence of work
discrimination equilibrium) making use of the preliminary lemmas above and the Bouwer’s fixed point
theorem.
Lemma A.5. In any work discrimination equilibrium, the employers’ strategy is characterized by a pair
of thresholds θ̂M , θ̂m ∈ (w, 1)2 such that a majority (minority) employer hires a majority (minority)
worker if and only if θ ≥ θ̂M (θ ≥ θ̂m).





βµM(θM , θm)(1− θM)





β(1− µM(θM , θm))(1− θm)
1− β + β[δ + (1− µM(θM , θm))(1− θm)] (A.11)
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Fixing a θm ∈ [w, 1], repeating the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1, it can be checked that
there exists a unique θ˜M(θm) ∈ (w, 1) solving Equation A.10. Further, since µW (θM , θm) is continuous
in θm, the solution θ˜M(θm) is also continuous in θm. Similarly, fixing a θM ∈ [w, 1], there exists a unique
θ˜m(θM) ∈ (w, 1) solving Equation A.11, and θ˜m(θM) is continuous in θM .
We can now define the two-dimensional function Θ(θM , θm) = (θ˜M(θm), θ˜m(θM)). Using the reasoning
above, this function is continuous and mapping the convex set [w, 1] into itself. Hence, applying Bouwer
fixed point theorem, a fixed point exists. Thus, there exists equilibrium hiring thresholds as claimed.
Our next lemma proves that the pair of threshold is unique and so is the employers’ strategy.
Lemma A.6. In the work discrimination equilibrium, the employers’ strategy is characterized by a
unique pair of equilibrium thresholds θDM , θ
D
m ∈ (w, 1)2 such that a majority (minority) employer hires a
majority (minority) worker if and only if θ ≥ θDM (θ ≥ θDm).
Proof. Consider the following function
D(θM) = θM − w1+θM
2
− w −
βµM(θM , θ˜m(θM))(1− θM)
1− β + β[δ + µM(θM , θ˜m(θM))(1− θM)]
, (A.12)
with θ˜m(θM) the unique solution to Equation A.11. Observe that any solution to D(θM) = 0 is a
fixed point for the hiring problem. We cannot prove uniqueness directly since by the Implicit Function
Theorem, θ˜m(θM) is increasing with θM as µ
M(θM , θm) is increasing with θM so the total derivative
of µM(θM , θ˜m(θM))(1 − θM) can no longer be signed. We instead prove uniqueness by contradiction.





M < ... < θ̂
(K)
M for all α
W ∈ (1/2.1).
As a first step, notice that as αW → 1, then µM(θM , θm)→ 1 for all θM , θm ∈ [w, 1]2. Hence, it must be





ND (since Equation A.10 become Equation A.4).
By the usual reasoning D(w) < 0 and D(1) > 0. Further, any odd solution (i.e., k odd) to D(θM) = 0
satisfies D′(θ̂(k)M ) > 0 and any even solution (k even) satisfies D′(θ̂(k)M ) < 0. Totally differentiat-








































< 0. Further, by the Implicit Function Theorem and using Lemma A.2, ∂θ˜m(θM )
∂αW
< 0




Using both results above and the Implicit Function Theorem, this implies that θ̂
(k)
M is strictly increasing
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all αW ∈ (1/2, 1) (since θ̂(2)M decreases with αW , it converges to θND; since θ̂(3)M increases with αW , it





Consequently, the solution to D(θM) = 0 is unique and so are the pair of equilibrium thresholds.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof follows directly from Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.6.
Proof of Corollary 1
Point (i). The proof that θDM(α
W , αF ) is strictly increasing with αW follows directly from the proof
of Lemma A.6. Recalling that the function D(θM) is defined in Equation A.12 and using the same

































< 0. Using Lemma
A.2, this last inequality implies
∂θ˜m(θDM )
∂αF
> 0 since θ˜m depends on α

















Point (ii). For point (ii), let’s define
F(θm) = θm − w1+θm
2
− w −
β(1− µM(θ˜M(θm), θm))(1− θm)
1− β + β[δ + (1− µM(θ˜M(θm), θm))(1− θm)]
, (A.13)
with θ˜M(θm) the unique solution to Equation A.10. Note that by Lemma A.6, there exists a unique
solution to F(θm) = 0 and this solution is θDm (ignoring arguments). Since F(w) < 0 and F(1) > 0,






























































< 0 since θ˜M(θm) only depends on α







> 0 as claimed.
Point (iii). To see this last point, note that µM
αW→1−−−−→ 1 by Equation A.9 (given F fm ≤ 1 − αW ).
Hence, Equation A.10 becomes equivalent to Equation A.4 when αW → 1, and the unique solution is
θ˜M(θm) = θ




−w = 0 as α
W → 1, and the unique





M for some α
1, this is also true for all αW > α1.
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solution is θ˜m(θM) = w for all θM .
We now turn to proving Proposition 1. The proof requires several preliminary lemmas on the properties
of several equilibrium objects. First, we establish some properties of the equilibrium threshold.
Lemma A.7. For all αF ∈ (1/2, 1), there exists a unique αW (αF ) ∈ (1/2, 1) such that θDM(αW , αF ) ≥
θDm(α
W , αF ) for all αW ≥ αW (αF ).
The threshold αW (αF ) satisfies the following properties:
(i) αW (αF ) is strictly increasing with αF ;
(ii) αW (1/2) = 1/2;
(iii) lim
αF→1
αW (αF ) < 1.
Proof. From Corollary 1, we already know that (a) θDM(α
W , αF ) (θDm(α
W , αF )) is strictly increasing
(decreasing) in αW , (b) θDM(α
W , αF ) (θDm(α
W , αF )) is strictly decreasing (increasing) in αF , and (c) for
all αF , lim
αW→1
θDM(α
W , αF ) = θND > lim
αW→1
θDm(α
W , αF ) = w. Further, given equilibrium uniqueness, it
must be (slightly abusing notation) that (d) if αW = αF = 1/2, then θDm(1/2, 1/2) = θ
D
M(1/2, 1/2).
Property (d) together with property (b) implies that for all αF > 1/2, θDm(1/2, α
F ) > θDM(1/2, α
F ). This
result coupled with properties (a) and (c) implies that there exists a unique αW (αF ) ∈ (1/2, 1) such
that θDM(α
W , αF ) ≥ θDm(αW , αF ) for all αW ≥ αW (αF ).
For the rest, point (i) follows from the Implicit Function Theorem using properties (a) and (b). Point
(ii) is a direct consequence of properties (d) and (a). Point (iii) follows from (c) holding for all αF .
We now study how the probability of hiring a majority worker (a minority worker) for majority firm
(minority firm) with openings depends on the proportion of majority type in the population. For ease
of exposition, we ignore arguments in the equilibrium threshold.
Lemma A.8. In a work discrimination equilibrium,
µM(θDM , θ
D
m)(1− θDM) is strictly increasing with αW and strictly decreasing with αF ;
(1− µM(θDM , θDm))(1− θDm) is strictly decreasing with αW and strictly increasing with αF .
















β(1− µM(θDM , θDm))(1− θDm)
1− β + β[δ + (1− µM(θDM , θDm))(1− θDm)]
(A.15)
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for α ∈ {αW , αF}. The claim then follows from Corollary 1.
For our next result, we introduce the proportion of majority employer among firms with opening which
we denote κF (θM , θm). We detail the properties of this equilibrium object.
Lemma A.9. The proportion of majority employers among firms with openings is:




αF + (1− αF ) µM (θDM ,θDm)(1−θDM )+δ
(1−µM (θDM ,θDm))(1−θDm)+δ
. (A.16)
κF (θDM , θ
D
m) is strictly decreasing with α
W and strictly increasing with αF .
Proof. The mass of majority employers with filled position is F fM defined in Equation A.7. The mass of
minority employers with filled position is F fm defined in Equation A.8. Hence, the proportion of majority
employers among firms with open position is
κF (θDM , θ
D
m) =
αF − F fM




αF + (1− αF ) µM (θDM ,θDm)(1−θDM )+δ
(1−µM (θDM ,θDm))(1−θDm)+δ
Observe that κF (θDM , θ
D






. By Lemma A.8, this ratio






has the same sign as
∆ =αF + (1− αF ) µ
M(θDM , θ
D
m)(1− θDM) + δ






m)(1− θDM) + δ
(1− µM(θDM , θDm))(1− θDm) + δ











m)(1− θDM) + δ
(1− µM(θDM , θDm))(1− θDm) + δ












is strictly decreasing with αF so ∆ > 0. Hence, κF (·) is strictly
increasing with αF .
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m) (compare Equation A.9 and Equa-
tion A.17). We make use of the properties below.
The next corollary proves useful for the rest of the proofs.
Corollary A.1. κF (θDM , θ
D
m)(1− θDM) is strictly decreasing with αW and strictly increasing with αF ;
(1− κF (θDM , θDm))(1− θDm) is strictly increasing with αW and strictly decreasing with αF .
Proof. Using Corollary 1 and Lemma A.9, we obtain that κF (θDM , θ
D
m) and (1 − θDM) have the same
comparative statics with respect to α ∈ {aW , αF} and similarly for (1− κF (θDM , θDm)) and (1− θDm). The
claim follows directly from Lemma A.9.
We now prove that the probability that an unemployed majority worker is hired by a majority firm
(κF (1 − θM)) is strictly higher than the probability that an unemployed minority worker is hired by a
minority firm ((1− κF )(1− θm) if and only if the proportion of majority-owner firm is sufficiently large.
Lemma A.10. For all αF ∈ (1/2, 1), there exists a unique αW (αF ) ∈ (1/2, 1) such that
κF (θDM(α
W , αF ), θDm(α
W , αF ))(1− θDM(αW , αF )) ≥ (1− κF (θDM(αW , αF ), θDm(αW , αF )))(1− θDm(αW , αF ))
if and only if αW ≤ αW (αF ).
The thresholds αW (αF ) satisfies:
(i) αW (αF ) is increasing with αF (strictly if interior);
(ii) αW (1/2) = 1/2;
(iii) There exists α̂F < 1 such that αW (αF ) = 1 for all αF ≥ α̂F .
Proof. From Corollary A.1, we know that (ignoring arguments whenever possible): (a) κF (θDM , θ
D
m)(1−
θDM) ((1− κF (θDM , θDm))(1− θDm)) is strictly decreasing (increasing) with αW and (b) κF (θDM , θDm)(1− θDM)
((1−κF (θDM , θDm))(1−θDm)) is strictly increasing (decreasing) with αF . Given the definition of F fm (Equa-
tion A.8), we also have (c) for all αW , lim
αF→1
κF (θDM , θ
D
m)(1 − θDM) > lim
αF→1
(1 − κF (θDM , θDm))(1 − θDm) = 0.
Further, by symmetry and µM = κF when αF = αW , we obtain (d) if αW = αF = 1/2, then
κF (θDM , θ
D
m)(1− θDM) = (1− κF (θDM , θDm))(1− θDm).
Property (d) together with property (a) implies that for all if αF = 1/2, for all αW > 1/2, then
κF (θDM(α
W ), θDm(α
W ))(1−θDM(αW )) < (1−κF (θDM(αW ), θDm(αW )))(1−θDm(αW )). This result coupled with




W )) ≥ (1− κF (θDM(αW ), θDm(αW )))(1− θDm(αW )) if and only if αF ≥ αF (αW ).
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Notice that by the Implicit Function Theorem and properties (a) and (b), αF (αW ), if interior, is strictly
increasing with αW . Further, by property (c), lim
aW→1
αF (αW ) < 1.
To finish the proof, define αW (αF ) = min{(αF )−1(αF ), 1}. The reasoning above proves that αW (αF ) is
unique for all αF , that κF (θDM(α
W ), θDm(α
W ))(1 − θDM(αW )) ≥ (1 − κF (θDM(αW ), θDm(αW )))(1 − θDm(αW ))
if and only if αW ≤ αW (αF ), that there exists α̂F < 1 such that αW (αF ) = 1 for all αF ≥ α̂F . Finally,
αW (1/2) = 1/2 comes from properties (a) and (c) above.
We now turn to findings conditions such that an employer never wants to hire a minority worker (Lemma
A.11) and a worker never wants to work for a minority employer (Lemma A.12).
Lemma A.11. For all αF ∈ (1/2, 1), if αW > αW (αF ), there exists βF < 1 such that for all β ≥ βF ,
in a work discrimination assessment, when his position is open, a majority employer’s best response is
to never hire a minority worker.
Proof. To prove the lemma, we introduce the following function V fJ,K(θ;¬K) which corresponds to the
continuation value of a physical type J , social trait K ∈ {M,m} employer with position filled by a
worker of productivity θ and social trait ¬K. (Note that the continuation value we have used so far is
implicitly V fJ,K(θ;K), we have omitted the second argument for ease of exposition).




M) so that V
o




Equation 3). By a similar reasoning, V om,m =
θDm−w
1−β . Further, since once a majority employer is tainted,
in a work discrimination assessment, he can only hire minority worker (i.e., he must behave like a
minority employer), we obtain: V oM,m =
θDm−w
1−β .
With these preliminary results, we can now turn to the proof of the claim. We just need to look at
one-shot deviation. Further, it can easily be checked that if a majority employer prefers not to hire a
minority worker with productivity 1, he never hires a minority worker. We thus obtain the following
continuation value if the majority employer deviates and hires a productivity-1 minority worker:
V fM,M(1;m) = 1− w + β(1− δ)V fM,M(1;m) + βδ
[
ρV oM,m + (1− ρ)V oM,M
]
(A.18)
The employer gets 1− w today by hiring the minority worker. If the match breaks (probability δ), his
identity changes with probability ρ and his continuation value is similar to a minority employer. With
the complementary probability, he is not tainted and his continuation value is the same as a majority
employer.
A majority employer’s best response is to not hire a productivity-1 minority worker if and only if:
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V fM,M(1;m) ≤ V oM,M . Using Equation A.18, this is equivalent to
1− w + βδρ(V oM,m − V oM,M) ≤ (1− β)V oM,M








Since the left-hand side is strictly positive, a necessary condition for this inequality to be satisfied is
θDM > θ
D
m. By Lemma A.8, this is equivalent to α
W > αW (αF ) for all αF ∈ (1/2, 1). If αW > αW (αF )
holds, then the right-hand side goes to ∞ as β → 1, whereas the left-hand side is always bounded.
Hence, there exists β
F
such that the claim holds.13
Lemma A.12. For all αF ∈ (1/2, 1), if αW < αW (αF ), there exists βW < 1 such that for all β ≥ βW ,
in a work discrimination assessment, when unemployed, a majority worker’s best response is to reject
any minority firm’s work offer.
Proof. For all J,K ∈ {M,m}2, denote a type-(J,K) worker’s continuation value when employed with a
social type L ∈ {M,m} employer W eJ,K(L) and his continuation value when unemployedW uJ,K .
In a work discrimination assessment, when playing the prescribed strategy (never works with a minority
employer), a minority worker’s continuation values are (again, we prove existence by construction and
we ignore arguments for ease of exposition):
W eM,M(M) =(1− τ)w + T (τ) + β(1− δ)W eM,M(M) + βδW uM,M (A.20)
W uM,M =0 + T (τ) + βκ
F (1− θDM)W eM,M(M) + β
(
1− κF (1− θDM)
)
W uM,M (A.21)




(1− β) + βκF (1− θDM)







1− β(1− δ) + βκF (1− θDM)
(1− τ)w
1− β (A.23)
13Note that we cannot prove uniqueness since we do not know the comparative statics of the hiring thresholds with
respect to β.
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Similarly, recalling that in a work discrimination assessment she only gets hired by minority employer,
a minority worker’s continuation values are:
W em,m(m) =(1− τ)w + T (τ) + β(1− δ)W em,m(m) + βδW um,m (A.24)
W um,m =0 + T (τ) + β(1− κF )(1− θDm)W em,m(m) + β
(
1− (1− κF )(1− θDm)
)
W um,m (A.25)




(1− β) + β(1− κF )(1− θDm)






β(1− κF )(1− θDm)
1− β(1− δ) + β(1− κF )(1− θDm)
(1− τ)w
1− β (A.27)
In turn, when a majority worker deviates and works with a minority employer, his continuation value
is:
W eM,M(m) = (1− τ)w + T (τ) + β(1− δ)W eM,M(m) + βδ
[
γW uM,m + (1− γ)W uM,M
]
(A.28)
A majority worker becomes a socially minority worker with probability γ upon break of the relationship.
Note that W uM,m = W
u
m,m since a tainted majority worker (i.e., with majority physical type and minority
social type) is never hired by a majority employer.
A majority worker’s best response when unemployed and matched with a minority worker is to refuse a
job offer if and only if: W eM,M(m) ≤ W uM,M . Using Equation A.28, this is equivalent to:
(1− τ)w + T (τ) + βδγ(W uM,m −W uM,M) ≤ (1− β)W uM,M
Using Equation A.23 and Equation A.27, this inequality is equivalent to after rearranging:
1− β(1− δ)





1− β(1− δ) + βκF (1− θDM)
− β(1− κ
F )(1− θDm)
1− β(1− δ) + β(1− κF )(1− θDm)
)
(A.29)
The left-hand side is strictly positive and bounded. A necessary condition for (A.29) to hold is thus that
the right-hand side is strictly positive. Notice that the function H(x) = x
1−β(1−δ)+x is strictly increasing
with x. Consequently, the right-hand side of (A.29) is strictly positive if and only if κF (1 − θDM) >
(1−κF )(1− θDm). Using Lemma A.10, this is the case for all αF if and only if αW < αW (αF ). When this
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condition is satisfied, the left-hand side goes to infinity as β → 1 so there always exists βW < 1 such
that (A.29) holds for all β ≥ βW as claimed.
We are now ready to prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1
Using Lemmas A.8, A.10, A.11, and A.12, we know existence and uniqueness of the thresholds. There
only remains to show that the interval (αW (αF ), αW (αF )) is not empty for all αF ∈ (1/2, 1). Once this
is proved, we just need to define β = max{βF , βW} < 1 such that the claim holds.
Suppose that αW < αW (αF ) so that κF (1 − θDM) > (1 − κF )(1 − θDm) (Lemma A.10). Recall that for
αF = αW , µM = κF . Further, comparing Equation A.9 and Equation A.16, it can easily be checked
that µM > κF for all αW > αF . Hence, for all αW ≥ αF , κF (1 − θDM) > (1 − κF )(1 − θDm) implies
µM(1− θDM) > (1− µM)(1− θDm). Using Equation A.14 and Equation A.15, this implies that θDM > θDm.
Hence, αW < αW (αF ) ⇒ αW (αF ) < αF (recall that θDM is strictly increasing with αW and θDm strictly
decreasing). Since, by construction, αW (αF ) does not depend on αW , this implies αW (αF ) < αF .
Suppose now that αW > αW (αF ) so θDM > θ
D
m. This implies that µ
M(1− θDM) > (1− µM)(1− θDm). For
all αF ≥ αW , κF ≥ µM so µM(1 − θDM) > (1 − µM)(1 − θDm) ⇒ κF (1 − θDM) > (1 − κF )(1 − θDm). Using
Lemmas A.9 and A.10, this implies that αW > αW (αF ) ⇒ αW (αF ) > αF . Since, by construction,
αW (αF ) does not depend on αW , this implies αW (αF ) > αF .
Putting the two previous points together, we obtain that for all αF , αW (αF ) < αF < αW (αF ), which
complete the claim.
Proof of Corollary 2
The claim has been proved in Lemma A.8 for αW (αF ) and in Lemma A.10 for αW (αF ).
Proof of Proposition 2
Point (i). Denote uJ the mass of workers with identity J ∈ {M,m} who are unemployed. Given that
majority workers only work with majority firm and minority workers with minority firm, in steady state,
51
we have (ignoring arguments):
uM =uM(1− κF (1− θDM)) + δ(αW − uM)
um =um(1− (1− κF )(1− θDm)) + δ((1− αW )− um)










δ + (1− κF )(1− θDm)
(A.31)
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) corresponds to unemployed workers who do not gain
employment (either because they are matched with an employer of a different type or the match is not
productive enough). The second corresponds to the mass of employed workers who lose employment.
In steady state, the mass of unemployed workers remain constant.
By Lemma A.12, in the work discrimination equilibrium, κF (1 − θDM) > (1 − κF )(1 − θDm). Hence, we
directly obtain that the unemployment rate of majority workers is strictly lower than the unemployment
rate of minority workers from Equation A.30 and Equation A.31.
For the duration of unemployment spells, notice that the probability that a majority worker finds a job
each period is κF (1− θDM). For a minority worker, it is (1− κF )(1− θDm). Again, the claim holds using
Lemma A.12.







. By Lemma A.11, in
the work discrimination equilibrium θDM > θ
D
m so point (ii) holds.
Robustness to change in wage offers
In this subsection, we discuss the robustness of our results to some changes in the hiring rule. More
specifically, we assume here that (1) a minority worker (and only a minority worker) can propose to
work for free for a majority firm and (2) a minority firm can offer its whole profit to a majority worker
to entice him to enter an employment relationship. We call this setting the ‘amended labor market.’
We obtain that this change to the labor market has no effect on the necessary proportion of majority
workers for discrimination strategies to be mutual best response.
52
To understand this result, note that our amended labor market only changes the present benefit of
deviating. The future cost of hiring a minority worker (for majority employers) and the future cost of
working for a minority firm (for majority workers) remain unchanged in this setting. Both actors still
expect to be ostracized by the relevant majority types if they become tainted in the future. As long as
these costs are positive, when αW is intermediate, we can always find a discount factor so that the future
cost is so high that it overweights all present benefits. Because our amended labor market increases the
present benefits, the discount factor needs to be higher than in the baseline model. However, the basic
logic of the model holds in this amended labor market. Proposition 1 holds among unchanged.
Proposition A.1. In the amended labor market, for all proportions of employers with majority identity
αF ∈ (1/2, 1), there exists two unique population thresholds αW (αF ), αW (αF ) ∈ (1/2, αF )× (αF , 1] such
that if the proportion of workers with majority identity satisfies αW ∈ (αW (αF ), αW (αF )), there exists
β
a ∈ (β, 1) such that for all β ≥ βa, workers’ and employers’ discrimination strategies are mutual best
response.
Proof. In the amended labor market, the same logic as in the baseline applies on-path when other actors
play a discrimination strategy. Hence, all results up to Lemma A.11 hold.
Now regarding Lemma A.11, the continuation values on-path are still Equation 3-Equation 5. The key
difference now is the value from hiring a minority who is willing to work for zero salary.14 That is, the
continuation value from deviation is (again we only need to check for the highest productivity case):
V fM,M(1;m) = 1 + β(1− δ)V fM,M(1;m) + βδ
[
ρV oM,m + (1− ρ)V oM,M
]
Again, discrimination is a best response if and only if V fM,M(1;m) ≤ V oM,M . Similar algebra as in the
proof of Lemma A.11 yields that this condition is equivalent to:
1 + βδρ(V oM,m − V oM,M) ≤ (1− β)V oM,M






A necessary condition is still that θDM > θ
D
m or, equivalently, α
W > αW (αF ). When this holds, we can
define β
Fa
< 1 such that the condition holds for β ≥ βFa. Note that since the condition above is more






defined in Lemma A.11.
14Note that we do not check that the minority worker would accept a zero salary offer. However, this is inconsequential
for the proof.
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Regarding Lemma A.12, the continuation values on-path are still Equation A.22-Equation A.25. The
key difference now is the value from working with a minority firm who is willing to offer a salary of θ.15
That is, the continuation value from deviation is (we only need to check for the highest productivity
case):
W eM,M(m) = (1− τ) + T (τ) + β(1− δ)W eM,M(m) + βδ
[
γW uM,m + (1− γ)W uM,M
]
Again, discrimination is a best response if and only if W eM,M(m) ≤ W uM,M . Similar algebra as in the
proof of Lemma A.12 yields that this condition is equivalent to:










1− β(1− δ) + βκF (1− θDM)
− β(1− κ
F )(1− θDm)
1− β(1− δ) + β(1− κF )(1− θDm)
)
The necessary condition, thus, remains the same as in Lemma A.12: αW < αW (αF ). When this holds,
we can define β
Wa
< 1 such that the condition holds for β ≥ βWa. Note that since the condition above






defined in Lemma A.12.
We can then use the reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1 to prove the claim.
B Proof of Section 5
Before proving Proposition 3, we first compare some important functions in a discrimination assess-
ment and in an assessment without discrimination. We first determine the tax revenue when in the
labour market subgame, the equilibrium exhibits work discrimination (RD(τ) ) or does not exhibit work
discrimination (RND(τ)) as a function of the tax rate τ .
15Note again that we do not check that the minority employer would be willing to offer a salary of one. However, this
is inconsequential for the proof.
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µM(1− θDM) + δ
1 + θDM
2
+ (1− αF ) (1− µ
M)(1− θDm)













Proof. In a work discrimination, the average production of a majority firm that produces is:
Pr(Maj employer)× Pr(Produces|Maj employer)× E(θ|Produces, Maj employer),












. Using the fact that we have a mass of






workers and employers are taxed, this represents the total revenues available from taxation from pair of
worker and employer with majority social identity. A similar reasoning for the minority yields RD(α).
In turn, using a similar reasoning as in Lemma A.3, it can be checked that the mass and proportion of
firms with filled positions absent work discrimination is 1−θ
D
1−θD+δ . Hence, the total revenues available for






Corollary B.1. For all τ ∈ (0, 1], RD(τ) < RND(τ).













+ (1− αF )
(
(1− µM)(1− θDm)









From Corollary 1, we know that θDM is strictly increasing with α
W and θDM
αW→1−−−−→ θND. Hence, θDM < θND.
Further, using Equation A.14 and Equation A.4, this implies that µM(1 − θDM) < 1 − θND. Hence, the
parenthesis on the first line is negative. Further, in a work discrimination equilibrium, θDM > θ
D
m (see
Lemma A.11) which yields µM(1 − θDM) > (1 − µM)(1 − θDm) (from Equation A.14 and Equation A.15)
so the parenthesis in the second line is also negative. Hence RD(τ) < RND(τ).
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note as wellWDJ (τ) andWNDJ (τ) the expected welfare of a worker with social identity J ∈ {M,m} when
the labour market equilibrim exhibits discrimination (subscript D) or does not exhibit discrimination
(subscript ND) and the level of taxation is τ . Recall that we assume that the labour market adjusts
instantly.














(1− θND) + δ +
TND(τ)
1− β (B.4)








κF (1− θDM) + δ
×W eM,M(M) +
δ
κF (1− θDM) + δ
W uM,M
Using Equation A.22 and Equation A.23, we obtain:




(1− β) + βκF (1− θDM)
1− β(1− δ) + βκF (1− θDM)
× κ
F (1− θDM)
κF (1− θDM) + δ
+
βκF (1− θDM)
1− β(1− δ) + βκF (1− θDM)
× δ





= (1− τ) w
1− β
κF (1− θDM)
κF (1− θDM) + δ
(1− β) + βκF (1− θDM) + βδ




= (1− τ) w
1− β
κF (1− θDM)




A similar reasoning holds for an equilibrium without work discrimination noting that the probability a
worker is employed is then 1−θ
ND
1−θND+δ .
Lemma B.3. For all αF ∈ (1/2, 1), there exists a unique α̂W (αF ) ∈ [1/2, αF ) such that if αW ∈






The threshold α̂W (αF ) is strictly increasing with αF and satisfies lim
αF→1
α̂W (αF ) = 1.
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Proof. From Corollary A.1, we know that κF (1 − θDM) is strictly increasing with αF . Recall that at





(1−θND)+δ . Notice now that for all α
W ∈ (1/2, 1), lim
αF→1
κF (1 − θDM) = lim
αF→1
1 − θDM > 1 − θND (see






(1−θND)+δ . All results together imply that for all α
W ∈ (1/2, 1),




(1−θND)+δ if and only if α
F > αF (αW ).
Notice further that since κF (1− θDM) is strictly decreasing with αW (Corollary A.1) and θND obviously
does not depend on αW , it must be that αF (αW ) is strictly increasing with αW . Finally note that
(slightly abusing notation) since θDM < θ
ND for all αW < 1 and lim
αW→1
θDM = θ
ND (Corollary 1), then
αF (αW ) < 1 for all αW < 1 and lim
αW→1
αF (αW ) = 1.
Defining α̂W (·) = (αF )−1(·) yields the result. In particular, αF (αW ) > αW implies α̂W (αF ) < αF .
For the next proposition, it is useful to denote
AD =αF
µM(1− θDM)
µM(1− θDM) + δ
1 + θDM
2
+ (1− αF ) (1− µ
M)(1− θDm)





















Proof of Proposition 3
In what follows, we assume that the tax rate is always strictly positive. The proof can easily be extended
to the case when it is zero under work discrimination or both with and without work discrimination.
Absent work discrimination, all workers are identical and they form a majority of the citizenry (f < 1).





) ≥ BND (B.5)
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If the social discriminatory policy is implemented and a work discrimination labour equilibrium follows,
we claim and prove in the proof of Proposition 4 that the tax rate preferred by majority workers is













Denote nowWDM :=WDM(τDM) a majority worker’s expected equilibrium welfare with work discrimination.














(1− θND) + δ +
TND(τND)
1− β
From Corollary B.1, we know that TD(τ) < TND(τ). Hence, if τDM = 1, we necessarily haveWDM <WNDM .




1−β = WDM(τDM). Since the function
K(·) is strictly concave, there exists a unique K1 such that τDM < 1 for all K ′(0) < K1.
Using Equation B.6 and Equation B.8 and the notation above, we obtain:










It proves useful to define Z(σ) = σk(σ)−K(k(σ)). Notice that given k(r) = (K ′)−1(r), Z ′(σ) = k(σ) >
0.
We first show that BD > BND is a necessary condition for WDM > WNDM . Suppose BD ≤ BND. The
Envelop Theorem then yields dW
ND
dBD





. From Corollary B.1,











The demand for discrimination is thus positive only if BD > BND. Using Lemma B.3, a necessary
condition is thus that αW ∈ (1/2, α̂W (αF )).
We now show a sufficient condition on K ′(0). Supposing αW ∈ (1/2, α̂W (αF )) holds, WDM > WNDM is
equivalent to:
BD −BND > Z(σD)− Z(σND),
with σD > σND. From above, Z ′(σ) = k(σ). Given the definition of k(·) (k(·) = (K ′)−1(·)), k(·) is
strictly decreasing (K(·) is strictly concave) so Z ′(σ) < k(0). Hence, a sufficient condition for positive
demand for discrimination is:
BD −BND > k(0)(σD − σND)
This means that there exists k > 0 such that if k(0) < k, then the demand for discrimination is
strictly positive. Note that k(0) < k ⇔ K ′(k(0)) = 0 > K ′(k) ⇔ K ′(0) < K ′(K ′(k)). Thus define,
K0 = K
′(K ′(k)). To finish the claim, define K = min{K1, K0} > 0.
Before proving Proposition 4, we first establish that minority workers do not demand the symbolic policy
when majority workers do (necessary condition αW < αF ).
Lemma B.4. Suppose αW < αF , then minority workers’ expected welfare is strictly higher under (d, τ) =
(0, τND) than under (1, τ) for all τ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. By the exact same reasoning as in Lemma B.2, we obtain that minority workers’ expected welfare




(1− κF )(1− θDm)















µM(1− θDM) + δ
1 + θDM
2
+ (1− αF ) (1− µ
M)(1− θDm)




(1− κF )(1− θDm)





Minority workers’ preferred tax rate with work discrimination, denoted τDm then satisfies using a similar











m ≥ τDM with strict inequality whenever τDM ∈ (0, 1).
To prove the result, it is sufficient to show that WDm := WDm(τDm ) < WNDm = WNDm (τND). If τDm = 1,
a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 3 yields that WDm < WNDm . If τDm < 1, we just need
to show that BDm ≤ BND which is equivalent to show that (1 − κF )(1 − θDm) ≤ (1 − θND). Recall that
µM = κF at αW = αF and µM < κF for all αW < αF (Lemma A.8 and Corollary A.1). Hence, for all
αW > αF , (1−µM)(1−θDm) > (1−κF )(1−θDm). We know that discrimination strategies are mutual best
response only if (1− µM)(1− θDm) < µM(1− θDM). Further, µM(1− θDM) < 1− θND for all αW ∈ (1/2, 1)
(Lemma B.3). Putting all results together, (1− κF )(1− θDm) ≤ (1− θND) so WDm <WNDm .
We can now turn to candidates’ behavior.
Proof of Lemma 3
Candidates are office-motivated and so always propose the platform preferred by a majority of voters.
Recall that from our assumption on indifference, if a majority workers prefer the symbolic policy, all
other citizens prefer d = 0 and αW = 1+f
2
(so votes would be split), candidates propose d = 0 then.
For the second part of the lemma, observe that the preferred tax rate of employers is zero since they do
not receive any transfer. We show that no candidate offers (1, τ) with τ 6= τDM in equilibrium. Suppose
that candidate −J proposes (1, τ−J) with τ−J 6= τDM . J can then win the election for sure by offering
(1, τDM). Indeed, if τ−J > τ
D
M , both majority and minority employers vote for J and so do majority
workers. If τ−J < τDM , then all workers vote for J since the minority’s preferred tax rate under social
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M (see Lemma B.4). Hence, by the usual reasoning, no candidate
offers platform (1, τ) with τ 6= τDM .
A similar reasoning yields that (0, τ) with τ 6= τND would be defeated by (0, τND). Hence, in equilibrium,
candidates propose one of the two platforms detailed in the text of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 4
Using Lemma 3, two conditions need to be satisfied for the symbolic policy to be proposed and imple-
mented in equilibrium:
(i) if identity is salient, then discrimination strategies are mutual best response (remember, citizens
oppose the symbolic policy when indifferent);
(ii) a plurality of the citizenry prefers (d, τ) = (1, τDM) to (0, τ
ND).
Necessary conditions for (i) to hold are for all αF , αW ∈ (αW (αF ), α(αF )) with the thresholds derived in
Proposition 1. Condition (ii) requires that (a) αW < α̂W (αF ) for all αF (among others) with the thresh-
old derived in Proposition 3 hold and (b) majority workers and their potential allies form a majority
of the population. Denote αpl the proportion of majority workers necessary such that (b) holds if and
only if αW > αpl. If majority employers strictly prefer (1, τDM) to (0, τ




We now show that the set (αW (αF ), α(αF )) ∩ (1/2, α̂W (αF )) ∩ (αpl, 1) is non empty. First, note from
Propositions 1 and 3 that α̂(αF ) < αF < α(αF ). Hence, we need to show that there exists αF ∈ (1/2, 1)
such that α̂W (αF ) > max{αpl, αW (αF )}. From Corollary 2, recall that lim
αF→1
αW (αF ) < 1. From Lemma
B.3, lim
αF→1
α̂W (αF ) = 1. Since both thresholds are continuous and αpl < 1, there exists αF ∈ (1/2, 1)
such that for all αF > αF , then α̂W (αF ) > max{αpl, αW (αF )}. (Note that there can be other sets where
all conditions are satisfied.)
Putting all results together, for all αF and αW such that αF > αF , αW ∈ (min{apl, αW (αF )}, α̂W (αF )),
β > β, and K ′(0) < K, then: (i) when social identity is salient, discrimination strategies are mutual best
response, (ii) a plurality of the citizenry strictly prefer (1, τDM) to (0, τ
ND). Since candidates are office-
motivated, both candidates converge to (1, τDM) then and the unique equilibrium is the discrimination
equilibrium.
16By Proposition 2, majority employers are always more sympathetic to the symbolic policy than minority employers.
Due to the multiple moving parts, we are not able to determine conditions such that majority employers prefer (1, τDM ) to
(0, τND).
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Proof of Proposition 5
As discussed in the main text, all non-discriminatory equilibria are similar (at least in term of compar-
ative statics with respect to αW and αF ).
Point (i). This follows directly from Corollary B.1.
Point (ii). This follows directly from Lemma B.3.
Point (ii’). The result is proved in the proof of Lemma B.4 given that social discrimination to occur
requires αW < α̂W (αF ) < αF .
Point (iii). A discrimination equilibrium exists only if τDM < 1. Further, using Equation B.5, the tax
rate is zero under no discrimination if and only if K ′(0) ≤ BND
AND
. Similarly, using Equation B.7, the tax
rate is zero under discrimination if and only if K ′(0) ≤ BD
AD
. From Lemma B.1, AND > AD. From the
proof of Proposition 3, for discrimination to occur, then BND < BD. Hence, τND = 0 ⇒ τD = 0 and
transfers are equal then. Suppose τDM = 0 < τ
ND, then transfers are strictly lower under discrimination.
Suppose finally that τDM > 0. Then total transfers are T
ND = K(ANDτND) under no discrimination and
they are determined by K ′(ANDτND) = B
ND
AND
. Total transfers are TD = K(ADτD) under discrimination









and K ′(·) is strictly decreasing, we
obtain ADτD < ANDτND. Since K(·) is strictly increasing, this implies TD < TND.
Point (iv). The result follows directly when τND = 0, τND = 1 (since a discrimination equilibrium
implies τDM < 1 by Proposition 3), or τ
ND > 0 and τDM = 0. Suppose thus that τ
D
M > 0 and τ
ND < 1.
Recall that, in this case, the tax rate is the solution to (ignoring superscripts): AK(Aτ) = B.





















> 0 and the function E(A) satisfies E ′(A) > 0.
Suppose now, by way of contradiction, that τDM ≥ τND. This implies thatADK ′(ADτDM) ≤ ADK ′(ADτND)
since K(·) is strictly concave. We know that AD < AND (Corollary B.1), so, under the assump-
tion, ADK ′(ADτND) < ANDK ′(ANDτND). This implies, using equation determining the tax rate that,
BD = ADK ′(ADτDM) < A
NDK ′(ANDτND) = BND. However, by Proposition 3, in the discrimination
equilibrium (specifically, for parameter values such that the equilibrium is the discrimination equilib-
rium), BD > BND. Hence, we have reached a contradiction.
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